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I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, human rights clinics have mushroomed across United States
law schools, specializing in work ranging from direct representation of asylum
seekers in U.S. courts, to international litigation, to project-based advocacy that
includes fact-finding visits and production of reports documenting human rights
violations throughout the world. Increasingly, those human rights clinics have
* The authors wish to thank the participants of the American Association of Law Schools (AALS)
Clinical Conference Workshop in May 2010 in Baltimore, Maryland, the Society of American Law
Teacher’s Bi-Annual Teaching Conference panel on Redefining Human Rights Lawyering Through the
Lens of Critical Theory in December 2010 in Honolulu, Hawaii, and the AALS Annual Meeting Panel on
Fostering Justice and Public Service in January 2011 in San Francisco, California. © 2011, Caroline
Bettinger-Lopez, Davida Finger, Meetali Jain, JoNel Newman, Sarah Paoletti, and Deborah M.
Weissman.
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begun to address human rights within the United States, and not just in places
beyond our borders. At the same time, domestic poverty law clinics are
increasingly looking to human rights norms in framing some of their advocacy,
which often takes the forms of direct legal services, community lawyering, and
law reform.
Critiques of international human rights lawyering point to imperialist narra-
tives and “victim essentializing” often perpetuated by human rights lawyering.
While these critiques may apply with equal force to the international and
domestic human rights arenas, they are most often leveraged against advocacy
directed outside of the United States that is project-based and norm-driven, or
that involves the direct representation of individuals characterized by the law and
advocates alike as “vulnerable victims.” Human rights clinical law professors
often struggle alongside students to develop lawyering strategies that are
responsive to those critiques yet still effective in achieving the goals of
clients—be they individuals, groups, or organizations. Although these ethical,
strategic, and pedagogic challenges may be relatively novel for human rights
clinicians, they are familiar terrain for many poverty law clinicians who have
long-struggled with similar challenges in the context of direct representation of
poor, marginalized clients and engagement in law reform and impact advocacy
efforts. Clinicians in other areas of social justice lawyering, particularly those
working in the poverty law arena, have developed a rich body of scholarship in
this area that has itself been influenced by the corpus of critical legal and social
theory. Nevertheless, these challenges remain for poverty law clinicians, too.
We,1 as human rights and poverty law clinicians, have felt encouraged to come
together and initiate a rich exchange of ideas, lessons and strategies for grappling
with these challenges, both independently and collectively. We initially presented
the core themes addressed in this Article during a workshop we led as a group at
the 2010 AALS Conference on Clinical Legal Education. Here, we seek to further
develop these themes. We review the ways in which critical theory has been
introduced to address vexing questions concerning “victim essentialization” and
“othering” in poverty and community development law clinics in the United
States. We then explore strategies for redefining human rights lawyering in a way
that is responsive to critical theorists and that informs and expands our teaching,
our advocacy, and our students’ sense of what it means to be a human rights
lawyer. In the process, we examine the changing role that human rights law and
advocacy have come to play in social justice initiatives within the United States.
1. In this Article, the term ‘we’ refers to a collective of human rights clinicians and poverty law
clinicians who came together to explore a constructive path forward from a set of shared frustrations and
challenges to social justice lawyering. The process of presenting our thoughts at various workshops, as
well as writing this Article, has been an incredibly useful exercise in collective self-reflection. We are
grateful to many of our peers who have offered their honest feedback at various stages, and hope that a
continued and robust discussion further contributes to the maturation of these ideas. We do not intend for
any of the thoughts presented here to be prescriptive, but rather offer them in the spirit of
recommendations.
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By bridging international human rights lawyering with domestic poverty and
community lawyering, we have found that our collective advocacy, and therefore
the pedagogy we employ in teaching and supervising our students, can be
enhanced by the contributions of critical legal theory. At the same time, we
recognize that critical legal theory requires ongoing development in order to
address human rights violations in ways that reduce the harm to those in whose
names we struggle, and in order to hold the United States equally accountable for
its contributions to those violations.
Section II of this Article reviews the historical and contemporary uses of
human rights strategies by U.S. advocates and law school clinical programs
addressing problems both abroad and here “at home.” We address critiques of this
human rights work and its corollary in the U.S. law reform world, and examine
how critical theory has helped to reconcile some of these dilemmas. In Section
III, we identify the dilemmas that remain, including the ways in which we
struggle against the perpetuation of an essentializing victim narrative, and the
structural realities, normative limitations, and the difficulty in various fora of
articulating the connection between complex historical determinants of human
rights abuses and the violations themselves. In this section, we use case studies
from our clinical courses to demonstrate the complexities of carrying out our
work and the purposes for which we put critical theory into service. In Section IV,
we embrace the lessons of critical theory to offer a proposed shift in how we
teach human rights lawyering and advocacy in the clinical setting while
recognizing the need to further deepen such lessons. Rather than focusing on the
identification of the immediate circumstances of human rights violations, we
explore how we might approach in both our teaching and our advocacy the
structural realities that serve as the framework for those violations, how we might
include the relevant ethical and professional responsibility principles, and how
better to incorporate victims’/clients’ voices and goals into our advocacy. Here,
we focus on teaching our students not only about human rights as protecting or
vindicating rights in a way that recognizes our clients’ human dignity and agency,
but also about the genesis of human rights violations. Moreover, we consider the
opportunities and challenges for teaching this critical theory-influenced approach
in human rights and poverty law clinics. In Section V, we offer final reflections on
the opportunities critical theory offers for advancing our teaching and advocacy
in the field of human rights, and the broader implications this may have on social
justice lawyering and advocacy in the United States.
II. HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY USES AND MISUSES OF
HUMAN RIGHTS PRINCIPLES
In this section, we provide a brief overview of the use of human rights
principles and norms in domestic, international and transnational settings. We
first explore what actually constitutes human rights work. We then reflect on its
historical usages, both in domestic settings and looking outwards beyond the
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territorial confines of the United States to examine how human rights principles
have been utilized, tested, and developed over the years.
A. What Constitutes Human Rights Work?
Human rights advocacy takes on many different forms, from litigation in domestic
and international tribunals, to foreign policy initiatives aimed at advancing particular
rights agendas, to grassroots advocacy campaigns aimed at advancing a particular
right, on behalf of an individual, a group, or a community. Here we seek to
identify the different approaches to human rights lawyering, in both domestic and
international settings, highlighting their susceptibility to critique.
1. Human Rights in the International Realm
Although the theoretical foundation for human rights principles dates back
thousands of years, the modern conception of human rights took root with the
creation of the of the United Nations (UN) and the drafting and adoption of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights in the immediate aftermath of World War
II.2 The historical events of the mid-twentieth century provided the momentum
and the political will for the creation of the United Nations with a governing
Charter that has as its centerpiece the protection and promotion of human rights,
formally institutionalizing human rights at the international level. But the
geopolitics of the post-World War II era and the Cold War dominated by Western
political and cultural ideology led to the construction of a human rights regime
focused largely on civil and political rights and directed at despotic regimes and
countries that refused to espouse democracy and capitalism as the benchmarks of
good governance.3 And, while that construct was historically grounded in the
evils of the Western hemisphere and specifically the Holocaust and subsequent
2. See A Brief History of Human Rights, UNITED FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www.humanrights.com/
what-are-human-rights/brief-history/cyrus-cylinder.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2011) (referring to the
Cyrus Cylinder (539 B.C.), in which Cyrus the Great’s decrees freeing the slaves, granting all people the
right to choose their own religion, and establishing racial equality, were recorded.) Scholars often cite to
early conceptions of “natural law” as the foundation for human rights and also refer to historical religious
texts in seeking to identify early conceptions of human rights. See, e.g., MICHELINE R. ISHAY, THE
HISTORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS: FROM ANCIENT TIMES TO THE GLOBALIZATION ERA (2004); DAVID WEISSBRODT
AND CONNIE DE LA VEGA, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 3, 13-14 (2007). For an
overview of the contemporary human rights movement, see LOUIS HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS 1 (1990)
(noting that the “contemporary idea of human rights was formulated and given content during the Second
World War and its aftermath . . . . [And t]he human rights idea found its contemporary expression in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1948, and in
the numerous covenants and conventions derived from it”).
3. Philip Alston argues lawyers played a critical role in the historic prioritization of civil and political
rights over economic, social, and cultural rights, noting the normative-judicial model of human rights
implementation is “dominated by lawyers whose tools are traditional legal reasoning, the use of legal
institutions and techniques, and the pursuit of familiar types of remedies such as administrative
regulations, legislative programs, and court judgments.” Philip Alston, Economic and Social Rights, in
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civil and political rights violations arising out of the West, it was not long before
liberal democratic states, international governmental and non-governmental
organizations alike, directed those constructs towards the global South, employ-
ing the human rights framework and mechanisms outward, seeking to use the norms
against regimes assessed as non-liberal, authoritarian, and dictatorial.4 While geopoli-
tics played a key role in determining the extent to which human rights were
pursued as part of a governmental foreign policy agenda, international non-
governmental organizations whose core missions were to uphold and promote the
human rights principles set forth in the UN Declaration on Human Rights and the
core international human rights treaties, sought to advance human rights globally,
sometimes despite the particular foreign policy objectives of the state.5
Lawyers seized upon the opportunities provided by emerging principles in
contemporary human rights developments, and have tended to approach interna-
tional human rights lawyering as cause lawyering, where the protection and
promotion of a core set of international human rights principles is the driving
cause. Included in the human rights advocacy toolkit were—and to a great extent
continue to be—onsite fact-finding “missions.” Representatives from interna-
tional non-governmental organizations (NGOs), deemed the experts, conduct
on-site or country visits, often aided by pro bono lawyers and sometimes
accompanied by congressional representatives or staff in hopes of engaging U.S.
political pressure, to investigate and document a set of human rights abuses.
Advocates then publish their findings framed in light of the target country’s
human rights obligations. Core to the reporting is the issuance of a set of
recommendations directed not only at the country at issue, but also at the
intergovernmental organizations that operate—or, in the eyes of the report
writers, should operate—in those countries. An additional set of recommenda-
tions are also directed to the United States government, urging that the findings
become a part of the institutional operations and the state’s immigration, foreign
policy and aid agenda for the country in question. Through the process often
referred to as “naming and shaming,” followed by advocacy aimed at wielding
the political and economic power of the Western developed states over
HUMAN RIGHTS: AN AGENDA FOR THE NEXT CENTURY 137, 152-53 (Louis Henkin & John Lawrence
Hargrove eds., 1994).
4. See Makua Matua, Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights, 42 HARV. INT’L
L.J. 201, 214-17 (2001).
5. For example, the then Lawyers Committee for Human Rights (now Human Rights First) published
an annual response to the U.S. State Department Reports on Human Rights, in which it sought to paint a
more complete and accurate picture of the human rights situation, one that was not subject to the filters of
the State Department’s foreign policy agenda. Importantly, too, those State Department reports are issued
because of a Congressional mandate brought about by the advocacy of the leading human rights NGOs.
See Michael Posner, Human Rights and Non-Governmental Organizations on the Eve of the Next
Century, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 627 (1997-98) (describing the activities of internationally-focused
non-governmental organizations).
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developing countries through foreign policy and sanctions, international NGOs
have sought to bring about positive change on behalf of individuals and groups
subjected to grievous rights violations.6
The human rights discourse and advocacy in the second half of the twentieth
century described above has been vulnerable to critique, due partly to its
generally limited substantive focus and unilateral approach. Despite their
inclusion in the core founding documents of the United Nations, economic,
social, and cultural rights as human rights were subsumed by the Western world’s
emphasis on civil and political rights, viewed as “First Generation Rights.”7 This
focus on civil and political rights was resisted by many governments, particularly
those governments subject to critique, who—in response to pressures to conform
to the Western neoliberal democratic regimes—would argue that economic,
social, and cultural rights should be given not just recognition, but primacy. The
paradigmatic debate was framed in terms of determining a hierarchy of rights: did
the right to vote and to freedom of expression trump the right to food and
shelter?8
Both the scope of the human rights agenda as well as the methodology
employed for pursuing that agenda has begun to evolve in the twenty-first
century, as advocates have begun to internalize and respond to the critical
theorists and others who resisted the didactic and largely Eurocentric nature of
the movement that characterized—and sometimes caricaturized—the targets of
their advocacy as disempowered victims helpless in their own pursuit of dignity.
6. See Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, Sticks and Stones: Naming and Shaming the Human Rights
Enforcement Problem, 62 INT’L ORG. 689 (2008) (describing and analyzing the effectiveness of publicity
based human rights strategies); see also Sarah H. Cleveland, Norm Internalization and U.S. Economic
Sanctions, 26 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 6 (2001).
7. See Frans Viljoen, International Human Rights Law: A Short History, UN CHRONICLE (2009),
http://www.un.org/wcm/content/site/chronicle/cache/bypass/home/archive/Issues2009/internationalhu-
manrightslawashorthistory?ctnscroll_articleContainerList!1_0&ctnlistpagination_articleContainerList!
true; see also Karel Vasak, Human Rights: A Thirty-Year Struggle: The Sustained Efforts to Give Force of
law to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 30 UNESCO COURIER 11 (1977).
8. The debate over primacy of rights that does not fully account for the interdependence and
intersectionality of rights was not unique in either time or place to the human rights discourse between the
Western industrialized world and the Global South, but was also seen in the early rights debates across the
United States and the then industrializing world, particularly among the working poor. See Paul Gordon
Lauren, A Human Rights Lens on U.S. History: Human Rights at Home and Human Rights Abroad, in 1
BRINGING HUMAN RIGHTS HOME, A HISTORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 13, 13 (Cynthia
Soohoo et al. eds., 2008) (“[S]uch obvious and severe misery among the working class ignited new and
profoundly serious questions about the very meaning of human rights. What good were the political
rights of voting and holding office or the civil rights of freedom of speech and religion, asked those who
suffered, to people like themselves who had no food to put on the table, no shelter to protect their
families, no clothing, no medical care, or no prospect at all for themselves or their children to obtain a
formal education?”); see also Catherine Albisa, Economic and Social Rights in the United States: Six
Rights, One Promise, in 2 BRINGING HUMAN RIGHTS HOME, A HISTORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE UNITED
STATES 25 (Cynthia Soohoo et al. eds., 2008).
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2. Human Rights in the Domestic Social Justice Realm
Enthusiasm for using international human rights to frame the struggle for
domestic social justice has undergone a recent resurgence, but it is not a new idea
or strategy. The utilization of human rights principles in U.S.-based rights
struggles has a long and mixed history. For example, attorneys for petitioners in
Yick Wo v. Hopkins cited international treaties recognizing “the inherent and
inalienable right of man to change his home and allegiance,”9 and the abolitionist
movement has been recognized by at least one legal scholar as “the first
successful international human rights campaign.”10 Although ultimately rejected
as a strategy, W.E.B. Du Bois articulated an international human rights objection
to domestic racial segregation as early as 1923.
Following the establishment of the United Nations and the adoption of the
Universal Declaration on Human Rights after World War II, advocates presented
their first petition to the United Nations challenging the domestic treatment of
African-Americans, framing their struggles in light of the global fight for
freedom.11 But concerned with how the U.S. campaign for racial equality would
play on the world stage, Eleanor Roosevelt herself urged the leaders of the
movement to keep their struggle internal to the United States, marking the
beginning of the practiced conception that human rights was something that
happened outside of the United States, and civil rights is what happened inside
the United States.12 Indeed, civil rights activists were severely condemned as
“un-American” and “communist” for linking domestic racial oppression with
international human rights.13 Moreover, the very meaning of human rights
became distorted as it was severed from the “Soviet-inspired”14 pursuit for
9. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (citing Article V of the U.S.-China Treaty of 1868)
(emphasis in original brief).
10. Jenny S. Martinez, Antislavery Courts and the Dawn of International Human Rights Law, 117
YALE L.J. 550, 554 (2008).
11. Hope Lewis, “New” Human Rights: U.S. Ambivalence Toward the International Economic and
Social Rights Framework, in 1 BRINGING HUMAN RIGHTS HOME, A HISTORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE
UNITED STATES 115-16 (Cynthia Soohoo et al. eds., 2008); see also Carol Anderson, A “Hollow
Mockery”: African Americans, White Supremacy, and the Development of Human Rights in the United
States, in 1 BRINGING HUMAN RIGHTS HOME, A HISTORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 89
(Cynthia Soohoo et al. eds., 2008).
12. Dorothy Q. Thomas, Against American Supremacy: Rebuilding Human Rights Culture in the
United States, in 2 BRINGING HUMAN RIGHTS HOME, A HISTORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES
4-5 (Cynthia Soohoo et al. eds., 2008).
13. Anderson, supra note 11 at 90. For a complete and critical review of the twentieth century U.S.
Civil Rights movement’s efforts to move from civil rights to human rights, see CAROL ANDERSON, EYES
OFF THE PRIZE: THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE AFRICAN-AMERICANS AND THE STRUGGLE FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS 1944-1954 (2003).
14. Gay McDougall, Shame In Our Own House, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT (Sept. 20, 2004),
http://prospect.org/cs/articles?article!shame_in_our_own_house.
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economic and social justice.15 While social welfare programs expanded, there
was no political constituency for framing these programs as human rights
entitlements. The government signaled its hostility to efforts to construct
economic and social matters as rights, as opposed to aspirations.16 The impact of
this deliberate dichotomizing of rights versus aspirations along lines of civil and
political as distinct from economic, social, and cultural still lingers. Until
recently, U.S. advocates implicitly acquiesced to governmental positions in terms
of human rights agendas and strategies.17
But while the reliance on international human rights norms and standards in
the successful challenge brought by the NAACP Legal Defense Fund in Brown v.
Board of Education is well-documented,18 it was also subject to critique.
Ultimately, Brown v. Board of Education is most often referred to as a civil rights
victory, and not as a human rights victory.19 Throughout this mixed history, the
reliance placed by advocates and adjudicators on the civil and political rights
enshrined in the constitution subsumed international human rights norms as the
domestic civil rights movement achieved success—or at least attention—in the
U.S. courts.20
15. Id.
16. Indeed, the U.S. government refused to ratify the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, despite its enthusiastic support for the Universal Declaration. Philip Aka, Analyzing U.S.
Commitment to Socioeconomic Human Rights, 39 AKRON L. REV. 417, 436 (2006). Gay McDougall notes
too that President Eisenhower abandoned the United Nations human rights treaty system when he came
into office in 1953, pledging that his administration would not seek future ratifications of international
human rights treaties. McDougall, supra note 14.
17. The U.S. government’s position resonated in the historical conduct of well-respected non-
governmental organizations such as the American Bar Association and Human Rights Watch (HRW). The
ABA opposed the Universal Declaration because it included economic and social rights, and HRW
viewed socioeconomic violations as “misfortunes.” Id. at 437.
18. Justice Richard J. Goldstone & Brian Ray, The International Legacy of Brown v. Board of
Education, 35 MCGEORGE L. REV. 105, 111 (2004).
19. Many scholars and advocates committed to social justice issues question the “triumph” of global
human rights in that case. Martha F. Davis, Public Rights, Global Perspectives, and Common Law, 36
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 653, 674 (2009) (noting that in Brown international norms were cited by litigators in
their briefs to the court but not mentioned in the ultimate decision); Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Brown
v. Board of Education in International Context, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 493, 502 (2005) (noting
that “Brown both reflected and propelled the development of human rights protection internationally.”).
20. See THE OPPORTUNITY AGENDA, HUMAN RIGHTS IN STATE COURTS: AN OVERVIEW AND RECOMMEN-
DATIONS FOR LEGAL ADVOCACY (2008), available at http://opportunityagenda.org/report_
state_courts_and_human_rights_2008_edition (noting the increase in state court cases citing to
international human rights law from their 2007 report on the same topic). The 2008 report cites to a range
of cases in which advocates have raised, with mixed success, international human rights law arguments.
For example, the California Supreme Court cited to international human rights treaties and the Universal
Declaration on Human Rights to find support for marriage as a fundamental human right. In re Marriage
Cases, 43 Cal. 4th 757, 818 (Cal. 2008). In Connecticut, former Supreme Court Justice Peters issued a
concurring opinion in which she used the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights and the Universal Declaration on Human Rights to support the notion that the right to a social
welfare safety net was enshrined in that state’s constitution. See infra notes 30-35, for examples of
Supreme Court cases in which international human rights legal norms and standards have been cited.
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This strategic emphasis on a civil rights, rather than a human rights, framework
in Brown has not gone unnoticed by scholars. Derrick Bell,21 Mary Dudziak,22
Richard Delgado,23 and Carol Anderson24 each make compelling arguments that
the plaintiffs’ victory in Brown, as well as the landmark civil rights legislation
that followed it, should be viewed critically as a reflection of a somewhat cynical
move by elite whites in power who sought to gain an edge in the Cold War with
the Soviet Union—a move that ultimately sacrificed the broader civil rights and
economic justice goals that a true human rights agenda might have advanced.
Today, however, domestic poverty and social justice advocates in the United
States find themselves at a unique historical moment for progressive lawyering
and human rights advocacy. Over the past decade, in response to an increasingly
conservative judiciary and the rollback of civil rights in the United States,25 these
advocates are incorporating with more frequency international human rights
norms, language and strategies into their work within the U.S. borders.26 This
increase stems, in part, from international human rights bodies such as the United
Nations Human Rights Committee and the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights providing accessible and credible opportunities for advocates to
raise human rights concerns, while human rights advocates, and even some
governmental actors, seek to restore the country’s moral identity by casting the
lens of human rights on violations occurring at home.27 At the same time, U.S.
courts are systematically closing the door on civil rights litigants, both through
21. Derrick Bell, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L.
REV. 518 (1980).
22. MARY DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY
(2000).
23. Richard Delgado, Explaining the Rise and Fall of African American Fortunes-Interest Conver-
gence and Civil Rights Gains, 37 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 369 (2002).
24. Anderson, supra note 11, at 90.
25. Caroline Bettinger-Lopez, Human Rights at Home: Domestic Violence as a Human Rights
Violations, 40 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 19 (2008).
26. Scott Cummings, The Internationalization of Public Interest Law, 57 DUKE L.J. 891, 895 (2008);
Risa Kaufman, Human Rights in the United States: Reclaiming the History and Ensuring the Future, 40
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 149 (2008).
27. Through the Universal Periodic Review, a process by which United Nations member states’
human rights are reviewed before the United Nations Human Rights Council, the United States
government and advocates from across the United States engaged in extensive consultations with civil
society in which domestic human rights issues were presented, and then brought before the United
Nations. See infra Sec. IV; Universal Periodic Review, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/
g/drl/upr/index.htm (last visited Apr. 18, 2011) (explaining the Universal Periodic Review (UPR)
process, outlining the U.S. government’s participation in the process, and providing links the reports
submitted by the U.S. government.); see also REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA SUBMITTED TO
THE U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE UNIVERSAL PERIODIC
REVIEW 2-3, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/146379.pdf (explaining its
participation in the process, the United States stated: “We associate ourselves with the many countries on
all continents that are sincerely committed to advancing human rights, and we hope this UPR process will
help us to strengthen our own system of human rights protections and encourage others to strengthen their
commitments to human rights”). For information on civil society’s participation in the UPR, and call for
human rights accountability in the United States, see www.ushrnetwork.org/campaign_upr.
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procedural rulings making it more difficult for plaintiffs to access the courts, as
well as through a substantive narrowing of the scope of constitutional rights.28
The methodologies employed by domestic social justice advocates include the
traditional “rights-based” enforcement methodologies—appeals to international
human rights tribunals such as those mentioned above and efforts to enforce
international human rights norms in U.S. courts, arguing that U.S. courts must
interpret U.S. law consistently with international norms, or at a minimum should
address international norms for their persuasive value.29 The Supreme Court has
signaled some receptivity to the latter advocacy strategy, citing international
norms in its recent decisions overturning the sentencing of a subset of juvenile
offenders to life without parole,30 the juvenile death penalty,31 and the
criminalization of consensual homosexual acts.32 In each of these cases, the
Court was careful to explain that while international human rights and foreign
law norms were not “dispositive,”33 or “controlling,”34 they were nonetheless
persuasive in interpreting the parameters of domestic constitutional rights-based
norms, “because the judgment of the world’s nations that a particular sentencing
practice is inconsistent with basic principles of decency demonstrates that the
Court’s rationale has respected reasoning to support it.”35
Domestic advocates are also including human rights strategies that employ
“broader activism such as documentation, organizing and education.”36 In fact,
some of the most successful recent examples of domestic human rights advocacy
have been led by grassroots coalitions and social movements, rather than by
28. Cummings, supra note 26.
29. Stanley A. Halpin, Looking Over a Crowd and Picking Your Friends: Civil Rights and the Debate
Over the Influence of Foreign and International Human Rights Law on the Interpretation of the U.S.
Constitution, 30 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 4 (2006).
30. See Graham v. Florida, 130 U.S. 2011, 2033-34 (2010).
31. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 576-78 (2005).
32. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572-73 (2003).
33. Graham, 130 U.S. at 2033.
34. Roper, 543 U.S. at 578.
35. Graham, 130 U.S. at 2034. For an excellent example of a district court’s articulation of the same
principle, see Lareau v. Manson, 507 F.Supp. 1177, n.9 (D.Conn. 1980) (“Apart from Connecticut’s
administrative adoption of the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners,
those standards may be significant as expressions of the obligations to the international community of the
member states of the United Nations, cf. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 883 (2d Cir. 1980), and as
part of the body of international law (including customary international law) concerning human rights
which has been built upon the foundation of the United Nations Charter . . . . It is well established that
customary international law is part of the law of the United States. See, e.g., The Paquete Habana, 175
U.S. 677, 700 (1900) . . . . [T]he Charter’s provisions on human rights are evidence of principles of
customary international law recognized as part of the law of the United States. . . . The adoption of the
Standard Minimum Rules by the First United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and
Treatment of Offenders and its subsequent approval by the Economic and Social Council does not
necessarily render them applicable here. However, these actions constitute an authoritative international
statement of basic norms of human dignity and of certain practices which are repugnant to the conscience
of mankind. The standards embodied in this statement are relevant to the ‘canons of decency and fairness
which express the notions of justice’ embodied in the Due Process Clause. . . .”).
36. Kaufman, supra note 26, at 149.
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lawyers or established legal advocacy organizations,37 suggesting that some of
the increase in human rights work by domestic poverty lawyers is driven by the
clients themselves. The Ford Foundation has chronicled the stories of several
grassroots organizations such as the Kensington Welfare Rights Union in
Philadelphia, the Women’s Economic Agenda Project in Oakland, the Deaf and
Deaf-Blind Committee for Human Rights in Ohio, and the national Poor People’s
Economic Human Rights Campaign, all of which remain movements led by poor
people, but whose ranks have expanded to encompass students, social workers,
human rights lawyers and others.38 In light of the human rights agendas increasingly
articulated by grassroots groups and public interest clients, if domestic social justice
lawyers “are to partner with these clients on the issues they have identified,
lawyers need to be able to work with human rights strategies and concepts.”39
Some of these strategies involve efforts to expand domestic human rights
lawyering beyond the realm of public “rights-based” law. As Martha Davis notes,
even where lawyers and advocacy organizations are involved in domestic court
proceedings, the high-profile constitutional rights-based adjudications such as
Roper and Graham should not lead us to believe that “public rights litigation is
inherently constitutional in nature, and that the importance of global context is
only relevant in such cases.”40 There is, as Davis points out, much room and need
to develop global human rights based advocacy strategies in litigating common
law “private matters with public consequences, such as housing, consumer affairs
and family law . . . [which] are often the bread-and-butter of federally funded
legal services offices for the poor.”41 Thus, Davis argues, “the future of public
rights litigation may look different than the immediate past, as litigants facing
constricting federal rights discover—or rediscover—the potential of common
law adjudication for social change and the role that global context can play in
judicial common law reasoning.”42
If the next generation of domestic social justice advocates is to fully realize the
human rights movement’s potential for realizing social justice,43 it is imperative
that they continue to think creatively and critically about their work.
37. See Martha F. Davis, The Pendulum Swings Back: Poverty Law in the Old and New Curriculum,
34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1391, 1410-11 (2007) (describing the recent success of the Coalition of
Immokalee Workers, migrant workers in south Florida, who explicitly used human rights education in
their successful economic justice campaign, as well as other grassroots organizations employing similar
strategies around the nation). See also CLOSE TO HOME: CASE STUDIES OF HUMAN RIGHTS WORK IN THE
UNITED STATES, FORD FOUNDATION 50-56 (2004), available at http://www.fordfoundation.org/pdfs/library/
close_to_home.pdf (describing grassroots organizations led by poor people who are adopting human
rights education, organizing and advocacy strategies).
38. See FORD FOUNDATION, supra note 37.
39. Davis, supra note 37, at 1411-12.
40. Davis, supra note 19, at 655.
41. Id. at 656.
42. Id. at 661.
43. For an exhortation to this end, see Susan R. Jones, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.’s Legacy: An
Economic Justice Imperative, 19 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 39 (2005).
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B. Critiques of Social Justice Lawyering
While not diminishing the important role human rights institutions and
advocates have played over the past century in protecting fundamental freedoms
across the world, the Eurocentric political and social construct of the human
rights discourse historically grounded in the post-World War II era has failed to
fully account for the interdependency of economic, social, and cultural rights
with civil and political rights, and the complexities that arise in the balancing of
those rights. It has also failed to acknowledge and give credit to human rights
struggles that preceded the United Nations, such as independence and antislavery
movements, and the women’s suffragette movements across the world—
struggles that did recognize the interdependence of economic, social, cultural,
civil, and political freedoms as all being central components to the recognition of
human dignity.44 This has led to a human rights paradigm highly susceptible to
charges of Western cultural and political imperialism.45
It is important, moving forward, to understand the theoretical developments
that have addressed the substance and the scope of the human rights agenda. It is
also equally important that advocates look to the lessons of the poverty law
movement and the work of critical theorists in thinking about how to advance the
newly defined agenda in a way that is thoughtful and self-reflective.
1. Critical Theory
Critical Theory has contributed to a powerful intellectual and political
movement that has influenced legal thought from which to critique law and legal
institutions. Critical Theory is associated with the Frankfurt School theorists
who, during the 1930s, urged the development of new forms of thinking to
achieve enlightening and emancipatory knowledge for a practical purpose: “to
liberate human beings from the circumstances that enslave them.”46 Critical
Theory seeks to articulate a theoretical approach to “unearth the false assump-
tions that had heretofore held humanity in its sway,”47 to pursue “‘human
emancipation’ in circumstances of domination and oppression,” and to be
“explanatory, practical, and normative, all at the same time.”48
44. See generally Tracy E. Higgins, Anti-essentialism, Relativism, and Human Rights, 19 HARV.
WOMEN’S L.J. 89 (1996); Ratna Kapur, The Tragedy of Victimization Rhetoric: Resurrecting the “Native”
Subject in International/Post-Colonial Feminist Legal Politics, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 1 (2002); Matua,
supra note 4.
45. Matua, supra note 4.
46. James Bohman, Critical Theory, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (2005), http://
plato.stanford.edu/entries/critical-theory/; see RAYMOND GEUSS, THE IDEA OF CRITICAL THEORY: HABER-
MAS AND THE FRANKFURT SCHOOL 2 (1981).
47. Bohman, supra note 46; David M. Rasmussen, Critical Theory and Philosophy, in THE HANDBOOK
OF CRITICAL THEORY 11, 13 (David M. Rasmussen ed., 1996).
48. Bohman, supra note 46 (referencing Horkheimer, the director of the Frankfurt’s School’s Institute
for Social Research).
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Critical Theory can also be properly described as “critical theories” which
have emerged as progressive schools of thought associated with multiple social
movements.49 In the context of law and justice, critical legal theories are
concerned with the ideology of law and the ways that law facilitates justice while
revealing how it may serve as a pretense for justice.50
Modern critical legal theory has most often been identified as critical legal
studies (CLS), described variously as an “intellectual current, an academic
movement, a professional identity, and a loosely knit organization.”51 CLS
emerged in the 1970s to challenge conventional legal thought and expose the
proposition of “neutral law” as myth.52 CLS has attempted to expose as fallacy
the “formalism” of legal thought and has challenged the concept of the
determinacy of legal precedent by suggesting the ways in which prejudices and
economic interests infect legal decision-making.53
While emphasizing the indeterminate and political nature of the practice of
law, CLS deliberately resisted a unified theory.54 At the same time, other critical
legal theoretical movements emerged including, but not limited to, critical race
theory (CRT), feminist legal theory, LatCrit theory, and queer theory, among
other outsider conceptual developments.55 These theoretical movements reflected
49. Bohman, supra note 46; Robert Rubinson, Mapping the World: Facts and Meaning in
Adjudication and Mediation, 63 ME. L. REV. 61, 71-72 (2010).
50. Jack M. Balkin, Critical Legal Theory Today, in ON PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICAN LAW 64 (Francis J.
Mootz III ed., 2009).
51. Pierre Schlag, Critical Legal Studies, in THE OXFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA HISTORY OF LEGAL HISTORY
295 (Stanley N. Katz ed., 2009). For additional reviews of critical legal theory see James Boyle, The
Politics of Reason: Critical Legal Theory and Local Social Thought, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 685, 706 (1985);
Ed Sparer, Fundamental Human Rights, Legal Entitlements, and the Social Struggle: A Friendly Critique
of the Critical Legal Studies Movement, 36 STAN. L. REV. 509, 517 (1984); Mark Tushnet, Critical Legal
Studies: A Political History, 100 YALE L. J. 1515 (1991); Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The Critical Legal
Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 561 (1983). Some have described CLS as bridging with the
Frankfurt School and radical intellectual movements of the 1920s and 1930s. RICHARD W. BAUMAN,
CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES: A GUIDE TO THE LITERATURE 3 (1996). It is important to note, however, that
some scholars argue that CLS has little in common with critical theory as articulated by Frankfurt School
philosophers. See Tommy J. Curry, Will the Real CRT Please Stand Up? The Dangers of Philosophical
Contributions to CRT, 2 THE CRIT: CRITICAL STUD. J. 1, 3-4 (2009).
52. See Boyle, supra note 51, at 706; Sparer, supra note 51, at 517 (noting that CLS focuses its critique
on the contradictions in liberal philosophy and law).
53. See BAUMAN, supra note 51, at 3.
54. Schlag, supra note 51, at 296. Louis Michael Seidman, Critical Constitutionalism Now, 75
FORDHAM L. REV. 575, 579 (2006) (noting “the indeterminate meaning of critical legal studies itself”).
55. Defining these theoretical movements is both antithetical to their purposes, often postmodern in
character, and is offensively narrowing. Instead of attempting to provide definitions, we refer here to
literature that might help expand the reader’s sense of possibilities with regard to these conceptual
developments. See RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 2-3
(2001) (focusing on the transformation of the relationship among race, racism, and power); Carlos A.
Ball, Sexual Ethics and Postmodernism in Gay Rights Philosophy, 80 N.C. L. REV. 371,376 n.21(2002)
(“While queer theory, as a field of academic inquiry, is not subject to easy definitions, its origins can be
traced to the dissatisfaction by many gay and lesbian academics with the identity politics of the gay rights
movement”); Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829, 831 (1990)
(suggesting that feminist legal theory is often defined by three components: (1) asking the “woman
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a disillusionment with the “unemancipatory rationality of a masculinist radical
politics” that was said to characterize CLS.56 Nevertheless, critical legal theories
and the various schools of jurisprudence with which they are associated might be
said to have a common purpose: a “dedication to transforming legal practices to
serve the values of equality and social solidarity.”57
As an analytical framework, these movements have problematized our
capacity to theorize and implement justice in a politically effective manner,
particularly in an age of globalization and growing interests in human rights
practice.58 The teachings of critical theory however, have not been applied with
equal force to critique the human rights enterprise and to advance social and
economic justice. In this section, we explore the utility in doing so.
a. Influence of Critical Theory on Domestic Poverty Lawyering
The pervasive influence of critical theory on domestic poverty law practice is
perhaps most obvious in the “cause lawyering,” or “impact advocacy” areas and
the more recent emergence of community lawyering. As Marc Feldman explains,
for many years among legal services lawyers there were basically two practices—
individual service cases and “impact” cases. Impact cases were “viewed as
significant and special . . . seek[ing] to advance the interests of a number of poor
persons by ‘reforming’ some widespread practice or abuse.”59 Many thoughtful
commentators have described this as a “false dichotomy,”60 and even more
poverty lawyers—including Feldman—recognize the importance of, and politi-
cal power in, the representation of individuals.61 In this Article, we too reject this
dichotomy62 and thus, as discussed below, refer to a type of lawyering with a
newer name—community lawyering.
question,” (2) feminist practical reasoning, and (3) consciousness raising); LATINA & LATINO CRITICAL
LEGAL THEORY, INC., http://www.latcrit.org (last visited Apr. 18, 2011) (“critical, activist, and
inter-disciplinary discourse on law and policy towards Latinas/os”).
56. Wendy Brown, Feminist Theory and the Frankfurt School: Introduction, 17 J. OF FEMINIST
CULTURAL STUD. 1 (2006). Critical legal theory also includes feminist legal theory, critical race theory,
Latcrit, and queer theory notwithstanding the important differences that caused the development of
separate theoretical strands and identities. Katherine Hessler, Bridge of Hope, Journey to Justice: An
Essay, 3 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 429 (2004) (noting that although there is no single definition of critical
legal theory, it is generally associated with identifying forces of oppression). See Critical Legal Studies:
An Overview, CORNELL LAW SCHOOL, http://topics.law.cornell.edu/wex/Critical_legal_theory (last visited
Apr. 13, 2011).
57. BAUMAN, supra note 51, at 4.
58. FRANCIS J. MOOTZ, RHETORICAL KNOWLEDGE IN LEGAL PRACTICE AND CRITICAL LEGAL THEORY xiv
(2006).
59. Marc Feldman, Political Lessons: Legal Services for the Poor, 83 GEO. L.J. 1529, 1538 (1995).
60. F. William McCalpin, Individual Representation Versus Law Reform: A False Dichotomy, in
LEGAL SERVICES FOR THE POOR 85, 85-88 (Douglas J. Besharov ed., 1990).
61. See Feldman, supra note 59, at 1538; Gary Bellow & Jeanne Charn, Paths Not Yet Taken: Some
Comments on Feldman’s Critique of Legal Services Practice, 83 GEO. L.J. 1633, 1647-48 (1995).
62. Bellow & Charn, supra note 61, at 1647-48.
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Beginning in the late 1970s and continuing through the early 1990s, scholars
and poverty law practitioners took a critical look at the practice of poverty law.63
The criticisms of lawyering for poor people that emerged focused both on the
lawyers themselves as well as the methodologies they employed. Recurring
themes in this critical analysis included poverty lawyers’ failure to understand or
acknowledge the limitations of litigation as a means of social change, with its
concomitant diversion of resources away from more promising strategies.64
Poverty lawyers were described as “out of touch with the needs and concerns of
those they represent,”65 and as “completely divorced from the realities of their
clients or the communities those clients inhabited.”66 This literature also
criticized the manner in which poverty lawyers related to their clients, in
particular the problem of lawyer domination over client autonomy.67 Poverty
lawyering, when divorced from client and community context, and “led” by the
lawyers themselves, was famously described by Gerald Lopez as “regnant.”68 As
William Simon observed, “[i]n this literature, client empowerment means
liberation from lawyers as much as obtaining leverage on the outside world.”69
Like the criticisms of human rights lawyering described in Section b. below,
poverty lawyers were criticized for adopting strategies that imposed and
perpetuated victimization narratives,70 often based on the privileged lawyers’
inaccurate assumptions about their clients.71
63. See, e.g., JOEL F. HANDLER ET AL., LAWYERS AND THE PURSUIT OF LEGAL RIGHTS (1978); SUSAN M.
OLSON, CLIENTS AND LAWYERS: SECURING THE RIGHTS OF DISABLED PERSONS (1984); GERALD P. LÓPEZ,
REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO’S VISION OF PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE (1992); STUART A.
SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND POLITICAL CHANGE (1974); Derrick
A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation
Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976).
64. Ann Southworth, Lawyers and the “Myth of Rights” in Civil Rights and Poverty Practice, 8 B.U.
PUB. INT. L.J. 469 (1999) (citing Scheingold, supra note 63).
65. Jayanth K. Krishnan, Lawyering for a Cause and Experiences from Abroad, 94 CAL. L. REV. 575,
579 (2006).
66. Feldman, supra note 59.
67. E.g., Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons of Client
Narratives, 100 YALE L.J. 2107 (1991); Barbara Bezdek, Silence in the Court: Participation and
Subordination of Poor Tenants’ Voices in Legal Process, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 533 (1992); Lucie White,
Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38
BUFFALO L. REV. 1 (1990).
68. Lopez, supra note 63.
69. William H. Simon, The Dark Secret of Progressive Lawyering, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1099,
1099-1100 (1994).
70. Anthony V. Alfieri, Disabled Clients, Disabled Lawyers, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 769, 778 (1992)
(describing “a victimization strategy of disability advocacy that is invented by lawyers and applied
equally in administrative and judicial forums”).
71. Michelle S. Jacobs, People from the Footnotes: The Missing Element in Client-Centered
Counseling, 27 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 345, 351 (1997) (“Perhaps unconsciously imitating traditional
decision-making, clinicians and poverty lawyers have decided amongst themselves how best the ‘poor
and oppressed’ can be empowered in the lawyering process. This decision continues to be made with little
input from the ‘oppressed’ communities they hoped to help.”).
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There are obviously many possible narratives concerning the still-evolving
legal services and poverty law movement, and we do not wish to oversimplify or
overstate our thesis. We believe, however, that one credible narrative thread is
that many aspects of the community lawyering movement are a response to
critical analysis of poverty law practice. As critical theory considered poverty law
methods, poverty lawyers struggled to develop both more effective and
collaborative models and to engage with the very real moral and ethical dilemmas
presented by their practice. Scholars were urged to produce bodies of work that
would be relevant to legal practitioners and client communities.72 Ethical
challenges were explicitly confronted. The challenge inherent in the critic’s
imperative to respect “the client community’s voice, vision, and humanity,”73
was appropriately recognized to be a “vastly more complex undertaking than
most lawyers ha[d heretofore] supposed.”74 Derrick Bell’s 1976 exhortation to
engage in the “long overdue inquiry” about cause lawyering and professional
responsibility,75 raised questions such as: who is the “client?;”76 how should the
lawyer navigate among “the often diverse interests of clients and class?;”77 and,
ultimately, to whom or what value system does the lawyer owe allegiance?78
These concerns are echoed in the ethical dilemmas confronting today’s human
rights practitioners and clinicians, and they have not disappeared from the scene
in clinics and practices with a domestic focus.
Significantly, a unifying theme emerged from the application of critical theory
to both scholarship and practice—a call to community. In his 1994 call for change
to poverty law practice, Edgar Cahn describes disassociation from the client
community by legal services offices and civil rights groups as parallel problems
that cause lawyers must address:
It is important to note how far legal services attorneys and legal services
programs have come since the mid-sixties. On all fronts, we have tended to
move away from community, away from the poor, away from collective efforts
to mobilize resources . . . . We lost contact with anything remotely like a
constituency . . . . It is no coincidence that the NAACP Legal Defense and
Educational Fund did the same thing: it severed all connection with the
NAACP—and continued its lone and valiant representation, increasingly
72. Gary L. Blasi, What’s a Theory For?: Notes on Reconstructing Poverty Law Scholarship, 48 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 1063, 1092-93 (1994) (arguing that critical scholarship in the field of poverty law should
address questions of what could or should be done about the problems the scholarship documents, from
which can be derived an ongoing collective theoretical dialogue about practice among communities of
poor people and their allies).
73. John O. Calmore, A Call to Context: The Professional Challenges of Cause Lawyering at the
Intersection of Race, Space, and Poverty, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1927, 1955 (1999).
74. Simon, supra note 69, at 1114.
75. Bell, supra note 63, at 471.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 492-505.
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isolated from those it sought to help, only to discover somewhat belatedly the
emergence of an underclass for whom most of its past victories were
irrelevant.79
Community lawyering, described more extensively in Part C of this Section,
entails understanding that lawyers and the client community are engaging in a
“collective fight for social change.”80 John Calmore, who was a veteran poverty
lawyer and critical race scholar, explained the professional duty of poverty
lawyers is to cultivate:
[R]espectful regard and comprehensive understanding of a world that is foreign
to us, even as we practice within it. Practicing law in the community is not a
tourist adventure and, therefore, we must eschew the routine of the autono-
mous, interloping advocate who dreams up cases in the home office and then
tests them on the community. That is, we must search for invitation,
opportunity, and connection that legitimate our very presence and committed
practice . . . . Only through this approach will advocates effectively become
incorporated within the client community.81
Advocates are encouraged to explore and to engage collaboratively with client
groups in non-traditional legal fora to advance the clients’ objectives, such as
organizing for political action.82 Progressive lawyers are called upon “to step
outside law and put their faith, however partial and reticent, in community,”83 to
partner with communities in determining an agenda, and to concentrate on
“building community resources and mobilizing community action.”84 The
lawyers who are part of “this emerging tradition act not as saviors or champions,
but rather as partners in collective ventures to change the world.”85
The extent to which the present generation of poverty law advocates have
internalized and adopted some of the lessons learned from critical self-reflection
and legal theory can be seen in Deborah Rhode’s exhaustive 2008 survey of
public interest practitioners.86 The survey reveals that poverty lawyers increas-
ingly measure their success in terms of client empowerment, community
integration, advances in public awareness and social attitudes,87 and that the
79. Edgar S. Cahn, Reinventing Poverty Law, 103 YALE L.J. 2133, n.46 (1994).
80. Lopez, supra note 63.
81. Calmore, supra note 73, at 1956.
82. Paul R. Tremblay, Rebellious Lawyering, Regnant Lawyering, and Street-Level Bureaucracy, 43
HASTINGS L.J. 947, 953-56 (1992).
83. Anthony V. Alfieri, Faith in Community: Representing “Colored Town,” 95 CAL. L. REV. 1829,
1830 (2007).
84. Id. at 1877.
85. Ascanio Piomelli, The Democratic Roots of Collaborative Lawyering, 12 CLINICAL L. REV. 541,
544 (2006).
86. Deborah L. Rhode, Public Interest Law: The Movement at Midlife, 60 STAN. L. REV. 2027 (2008).
87. Id. at 2036.
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lawyers have taken steps not to over-rely on litigation as the sole or even primary
means to effect change, instead employing multiple approaches.88 Rhode’s report
emphasizes that collaboration with grassroots organizations is “widely perceived
as critical in securing sustainable social change,” with many legal organizations,
including law school clinics,89 working in partnership with community groups or
coalitions to provide services to secure legal and policy reforms.90 While poverty
law, including that practiced by law school clinics, has internalized and
incorporated many elements of critical theory into its day-to-day practices, we
continue to struggle with victimization narratives, with the dignity a client must
often relinquish to claim a legal benefit, and with how and when to teach these
issues to our clinical students.
b. Influence of Critical Theory on the International Human Rights Movement
As referenced above, the human rights movement, as it developed in the
second half of the twentieth century, was susceptible to a range of criticisms,
including charges of cultural imperialism from those against whom the norms
and paradigm were employed, from important voices within the critical theory
movement, and from cultural relativists who challenged the concept of the
universality of human rights.91 Makau Matua, a leading critical theorist in this
realm, has provided a useful framework for assessing the human rights paradigm,
setting forth what he has called the human rights movement’s “damning
metaphor,” in which the “Savages-Victims-Saviors” triad drives the human rights
paradigm.92 As Matua explains, the human rights rhetoric has historically
approached governments in a stark black and white framework, in which the
“evil” State, “expresses itself through an illiberal, anti-democratic, or other
authoritarian culture,” and works as the “operational instrument of savagery”
when it deviates from cultural practices of the West.93 The Victim within the
human rights metaphor is characterized as “a powerless, helpless innocent whose
naturalist attributes have been negated by the primitive and offensive actions of
88. Id. at 2043-44, 2046.
89. See Alfieri, supra note 70; Scott L. Cummings & Ingrid V. Eagly, A Critical Reflection on Law and
Organizing, 48 UCLA L. REV. 443 (2001); Rhode, supra note 86, at 2064.
90. Rhode, supra note 86, at 2064. Interestingly, this movement itself has spawned additional critical
analysis. See Cummings & Eagly, supra note 89, at 490 (cautioning poverty lawyers about, inter alia,
“tradeoffs between organizing and conventional legal practice, role confusion among lawyer-organizers,
and the potential for client coercion in the law and organizing context”).
91. See generally Guyora Binder, Cultural Relativism and Cultural Imperialism in Human Rights
Law, 5 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 211, 217 (1999); see, e.g., Hilary Charlesworth et. al., Feminist
Approaches to International Law, 85 AM. J. INT’L L. 595, 625 (1991); L. Amede Obiora, Bridges and
Barricades: Rethinking Polemics and Intransigence in the Campaign Against Female Circumcision, 47
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 275 (1997); Michael J. Perry, Are Human Rights Universal? The Relativist
Challenge and Related Matters, 19 HUM. RTS. Q. 461 (1997).
92. Matua, supra note 4.
93. Id. at 203.
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the state or the cultural foundation of the state.”94 And the Savior is the “victim’s
bulwark against tyranny.” Matua elaborates:
The simple, yet complex promise of the savior is freedom: freedom from the
tyrannies of the state, tradition, and culture. But it is also the freedom to create a
better society based on particular values. In the human rights story, the savior is
the human rights corpus itself, with the United Nations, Western governments,
INGOs, and Western charities as the actual rescuers, redeemers of a benighted
world. In reality, however, these institutions are merely fronts. The savior is
ultimately a set of culturally based norms and practices that inhere in liberal
thought and philosophy.95
Matua’s metaphor provides an illustrative framework for grounding critiques
of the human rights movement as an inherently Eurocentric movement that seeks
to shame “other” cultures as the inferior savage for operating outside of Western
cultural norms promoted under the guise of human rights.96
Other critical theorists have warned human rights advocates that narratives
constructed for the specific purpose of assisting clients with their asylum claims,
for example, may contribute to cultural essentialism.97 Ratna Kapur has
cautioned feminists about the post-colonial construction of the Third World
victim subject aided in part by the deployment of feminist politics in the realm of
international human rights.98 Critical theory has served as a cautionary note that
asylum claims may function, as observed by Michelle McKinley, as “the
paradigmatic example of post-colonial rescue and the contemporary extension of
the maternal imperialist project,” thus contributing to a racialized discourse of
victimhood.99 Isabelle Gunning has critiqued the hypocritical manner with which
international human rights norms are exposed and the ways in which issues
involving asylum, particularly those that are gender based, function to penalize
others while exempting similar harmful acts committed in the United States from
condemnation.100 Other scholars, drawing on the work of Angela Harris who
upended the idea that “a unitary, ‘essential’ women’s experience can be isolated
and described independently of race, class, sexual orientation,”101 have demon-
strated the way that problematic notions of essentialism have been embedded in
94. Id.
95. Id. at 204.
96. Id. at 205.
97. Michelle A. McKinley, Cultural Culprits, 24 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 91, 98 (2009).
98. Kapur, supra note 44, at 2.
99. McKinley, supra note 97, at 103.
100. Isabelle R. Gunning, Global Feminism at the Local Level: Criminal and Asylum Laws Regarding
Female Genital Surgeries, 3 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 45, 61 (1991).
101. Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 585
(1990).
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international human rights work generally.102 Critics have also paid attention to
lawyering methodologies and have warned against a top-down approach where
legal strategies and decisions are determined by elites who deliberate and debate
separate and apart from client communities. They have urged the need to pay
attention to clients’ stories while recognizing clients’ needs and abilities to
employ “strategic uses of victimhood narratives.”103
Many of the important critiques offered by these critical theorists have begun
to insert themselves into human rights work to produce new ways of thinking and
conducting legal advocacy based on human rights principles. Increasingly,
scholars and practitioners have recognized the need to reconstruct human rights
theory through the application of critical theory.104 The harsh assessment of
human rights work that portrays “human rights activists [as] . . . thought-
less, shortsighted, Anglo/Eurocentric, Western Imperialists, perpetuating colonial-
ist stereotypes, and glorifying autonomy (. . . label[ed] a Western construct) over
collectivism” has fostered the development of a more reflective approach to
human rights work.105 Northern/Western perspectives on human rights norms are
now more likely to be interrogated for their questionable assumptions of
universality, colonial legacies, and the voices they exclude.106 Scholars have
exposed the cultural arrogance in those human rights discourses that characterize
violations as discrimination (us/here) and persecution (other/there).107
Moreover, influenced by critical theories, many U.S. human rights attorneys
are circumspect about their roles as elites within the legal system. Many have
endeavored to develop a client-centered, non-hierarchical approach in their work
in order to accomplish a “redistribution of power” within their own relationships
as they simultaneously seek such a goal for their clients.108 Critical theorists have
also contributed to an expanded human rights framework that now includes
economic, social, and cultural rights as human rights along with the traditional
focus on civil and political rights. As human rights practitioners have exposed the
102. Higgins, supra note 44.
103. Id. at 115; Matua supra note 4 (critiquing the essentialist construction of savages-victims and
saviors).
104. Berta Esperanza Hernandez-Truyol, The Gender Bend: Culture, Sex, and Sexuality-a Latcritical
Human Rights Map of Latina/o Border Crossings, 83 IND. L.J. 1283, 1330 (2008).
105. Dina Francesca Haynes, Client Centered Human Rights Advocacy, 13 CLINICAL L. REV. 379, 386
(2006).
106. Berta Esperanza Hernandez-Truyol, Beyond the First Decade: A Forward-looking History of
Latcrit Theory, Community and Praxis, 17 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 169, 204 (2006); Berta Esperanza
Hernandez-Truyol, Culture, Nationhood, and the Human Rights Ideal, 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. 817, 819,
829 (2000).
107. Jacqueline Bhabha, Internationalist Gatekeepers?: The Tension Between Asylum Advocacy and
Human Rights, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS.J. 155, 163 (2002); see FROM THE MARGINS OF GLOBALIZATION,
CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON HUMAN RIGHTS 5 (Neve Gordon ed., 2004) (challenging human rights’
conceptual cultural superiority).
108. See Haynes, supra note 105, at 394; Hessler, supra note 56, at 3.
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false dichotomy that privileged civil and political rights to the exclusion of other
categories of rights, they have incorporated poverty law and domestic civil rights
issues within their docket and have applied international legal norms to their
analysis of a range of national and local issues.109 A network of human rights
advocates has stepped forward to monitor and report on the United States’ failure
to implement treaty obligations at home.110
As Berta Esperanza Hernández-Truyol has observed, “[c]ritical theory offers
the concepts of multidimensionality, interconnectivity, multiplicity, intersection-
ality, and anti-essentialism. Human rights theory offers both an expanded
rights-base and the interdependence and indivisibility ideal. These strands
together offer fertile ground to refute, reject, and invalidate the monocular
approach that atomizes our deliciously complex selves.”111 Nonetheless, as we
demonstrate below, the contribution that critical theory can make to social justice
lawyering and teaching remains underdeveloped.
III. UNFINISHED BUSINESS; DILEMMAS THAT REMAIN
Teaching and practicing human rights law, whether internationally or domesti-
cally, have a purpose. As a conceptual matter, the paramount goal of our
collective work is the alleviation of human suffering.112 Teachers and practitio-
ners identify cases and events where the human dignity of vulnerable groups has
not been recognized and where individuals have been denied protection from
109. See supra, Part III.A.2; See generally, Bettinger-Lopez, supra note 25 (seeking government
accountability for failure to enforce a domestic violence protection order); Meetali Jain, Bringing Human
Rights Home: The DC Right to Housing Campaign, 17 No. 3 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 10; Deborah Labelle,
Bringing Human Rights Home to the World of Detention, 40 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 79 (2008)
(showing that the rights of prisoners subjected to sexual violence); Cynthia Soohoo, Close to Home:
Social Justice Activism and Human Rights, 40 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 7 (2008).
110. The U.S. Human Rights Network, a national network of over 200 civil and human rights
organizations, has coordinated broad-based civil society participation in the various UN treaty-
compliance review processes, including the review of the United States before the UN Human Rights
Committee under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the UN Committee on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination under the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Racial Discrimination (ICERD). See About Us, U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS NETWORK, http://www.ushrnetwork.
org/node/5 (last visited Apr. 18, 2011). For information on the coordinated work of the U.S. Human
Rights Network and its members around the U.S. ICERD review and U.S. implementation of its
obligations under ICERD, see Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS
NETWORK, http://www.ushrnetwork.org/content/campaignproject/elimination-all-forms-racial-discrimi-
nation-icerd (last visited Apr. 18, 2011). The U.S. Human Rights Network also served as the coordinating
body for civil society participation as the United States underwent its first Universal Periodic Review
before the UN Human Rights Council, through which more than 300 advocacy organizations, grassroots
advocates, and academics contributed. See See Universal Product Review Product, U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS
NETWORK, http://www.ushrnetwork.org/campaign_upr (last visited Apr. 18, 2011).
111. Hernandez-Truyol, supra note 104, at 1330.
112. Kenneth Paul Kinyua, The Accountability of Multinational Corporations for Human Rights
Violations: A Critical Analysis of Select Mechanisms and Their Potential to Protect Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights in Developing Countries (2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_1599842.
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harm. To accept a case or cause is to signal our judgment that circumstances
indicate human rights abuses. In the international and domestic framework in
which we as clinical professors carry out our analysis and assignments, we
describe atrocities and degradation ranging from femicide (feminicidio)113 in
Latin America to the hurricane-related disasters and aftermath of displaced
persons in New Orleans. As social justice lawyers, by our presentation of the facts and
our demands for remedy, we expose a brutality or deprivation suffered by individuals
and/or communities, depict their circumstances as dehumanizing, and seek to
identify and hold accountable individual actors, groups, institutions, or states.114
As described in Part II, in the context of international and transnational human
rights work, critical legal theory has influenced our efforts to avoid portraying
human rights violations in other parts of the world (East and South) as cultural
pathologies. Human rights advocacy is informed by a recognition that individuals
and groups in the United States also suffer human rights violations comparable to
violations abroad, thus avoiding the “our culture and theirs” bifurcation.115
Critical legal theory contributes to the dialogue challenging the presumption of
U.S. exceptionalism, a long-standing obstacle to the application of a human-
rights law approach to domestic rights deprivations,116 as progressive advocates
have begun to inscribe social justice lawyering at home within a human rights
framework. At the same time, some teach the practice of asylum law for the
purpose of pursuing individualized relief, and struggle with how to apply critical
theory in attempts to avoid stereotypes and eschew the “victimhood/agency
dichotomy”117 the legal system calls upon us to provide.
Critical approaches have greatly transformed the field both conceptually and in
practice, yet all too often, human rights lawyers fail to sufficiently problematize
the inequities we seek to redress. At the same time, we have not sufficiently
counteracted the distorted victim and other narratives that we, and the systems in
which we operate, create and perpetuate. Moreover, we have failed to close the
gap that affects relationships between clients and lawyers. Our work sometimes
falls short of an approach that exemplifies solidarity with the very communities
and individuals we call our clients.
113. TERRORIZING WOMEN: FEMINICIDE IN THE AMERICAS (Rosa-Linda Fregoso & Cynthia Bejarano
eds., 2010).
114. See Peter Benson, Edward F. Fisher & Kedron Thomas, Resocializing Suffering: Neoliberalism,
Accusation, and the Sociopolitical Context of Guatemala’s New Violence, 35 LATIN AM. PERSP. 38, 40
(2008) (describing typical responses to violence as “the erosion of social awareness”).
115. See Bhabha, supra note 107, at 163 (noting similar domestic violence rates in countries from
which asylum seekers flee to those from which they seek refuge); McKinley, supra note 97, at 111
(identifying the ways that cultural essentialism and other critical questions are framed in the context of
asylum and cultural defense cases).
116. Cynthia Soohoo & Suzanne Stolz, Bringing Theories of Human Rights Change Home, 77
FORDHAM L. REV. 459, 461, 470 (2008).
117. See McKinley, supra note 97, at 114.
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A. Addressing the Historical and Complicated Determinants of Human
Rights Abuses: Challenging Post-Colonial/U.S. Imperialist Power
at Home and Abroad
As a matter of teaching and practice, human rights advocates often neglect to
examine the structural-historical sources of human rights crises. Human rights
abuses often occur in post-colonial contexts, in disintegrating states or states with
alternative forms of security (e.g., warlordism), and in places where there is fierce
competition for resources. In the United States (and elsewhere), systemic
inequities are often manifested in social relationships that unravel, whereby, as
Boaventura de Sousa Santos has recognized, “large bodies of populations are
irreversibly kept outside or thrown out of any kind of social contract.”118 In these
circumstances, violence and persecution can more easily take hold and systemic
deprivation of basic human needs is common. And while it is true that human
rights scholars and lawyers have begun to name social, economic, and cultural
rights (in addition to political and civil) as human rights, as clinical law
professors engaged in social justice lawyering, we have yet to examine
sufficiently or consistently in our teaching or our practice the relationship
between socio-cultural and political-economic conditions on the one hand, and
human rights violations on the other. Our efforts to link the consequences of a
market economy, as articulated in the form of domestic politics and foreign
policies, with human rights violations are wanting.
In our international and transnational work, we do not adequately confront the
ways in which the United States’ attempts to order the world around its strategic
needs and economic interests have contributed to the conditions that produce
human rights violations committed abroad. As Louise Arbor has noted, although
the root causes of violence, including torture, often involve economic and social
deprivations, human rights activists continue to obscure the nature of this
relationship.119 These circumstances are largely a function of U.S. power and
control over the world’s global economy. Chris Patten, Chancellor of Oxford
University, has observed, “[f]or all the talk about multipolarity and a post-
American world, the U.S. remains the only superpower, the only country that
matters everywhere . . . [with] apparent complete military mastery of the global
commons.”120 As human rights advocates in the United States, we have first-hand
“deep knowledge of the beast,” and thus an opportunity, and indeed an
118. Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Nuestra America: Reinventing a Subaltern Paradigm of Recogni-
tion and Redistribution, 54 RUTGERS L. REV. 1049, 1050 (2002); see also Thomas B. Nachbar, Defining
the Rule of Law Problem, 12 GREEN BAG 2d 303, 308 (2009) (describing, for example, warlordism as “a
legally illegitimate form of security).
119. LOUISE ARBOR, ATTACKING THE ROOT CAUSES OF TORTURE, POVERTY, INEQUALITY AND VIOLENCE 9
(Thomas E. McCarthy ed., 2006).
120. Chris Patten, What is Europe to Do? NEW YORK REV. BOOKS (2010), available at http://www.
nybooks.com/articles/archives/2010/mar/11/what-is-europe-to-do/.
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obligation, to set in relief the sources of vulnerability and violence that emanate
from within.121
Certainly in our domestic human rights work, U.S. institutions and corporate
actors are often targets of complaints and petitions. However, this usually takes
the form of idiosyncratic relief and not a systemic or enduring remedy. In our
direct client representation, we do not explicitly challenge the liberal political
theory that sustains a welfare system that relies in the first instance on economic
and market factors, and secondarily, on kinship systems, community ties, and
private charities to sustain its citizens.122 The assumption that the market is the
optimal regulatory mechanism for the distribution of goods and services, which
in turn forecloses the need for safety-net programs except through a residualist
welfare system, is usually left uncontested.123 While we may focus on poverty,
the question of the relationship between inequality and rights violations has not
sufficiently garnered our attention or efforts.124 Although we address the
consequential poverty, violence, and suffering as human rights issues, liberal
political and economic theories as contributors to human rights abuses remain
largely outside of the human rights dialectic.
Confronting human rights abuses implies the need to challenge the political
and economic arrangements that create them. Without attention to the structural
inequalities and political economic conditions that foster rights deprivations and
render particular groups vulnerable to repression, our advocacy may fail to
advance beyond the immediate situation of our clients’ suffering, and fail to
imbue our students with a comprehensive understanding of the source of clients’
problems. Our task, to be sure, is to provide redress to those who have endured
rights violations. But we ought not to elide from view the historically contingent
manner in which human rights violators are produced. While we may identify
abuses as the by-product of oppressive regimes, we may fail to lay bare their
determinants, thus diminishing efforts to challenge larger oppressive structures
from which they originate.125 Without an effort to understand and unpack the
genesis of human rights violations, we will contribute to a human rights discourse
limited to victims and perpetrators, and a depiction of barbaric regions of the
121. Santos, supra note 118, at 1075.
122. ROBERT E. GOODIN ET AL., THE REAL WORLDS OF WELFARE CAPITALISM 41, 88 (1999) (observing
that liberals conceive of liberty as “freedom ‘from’ interference by other human agents in one’s own
pursuits”).
123. See Anthony Giddens & Will Hutton, Conversation, in GLOBAL CAPITALISM 44 (Will Hutton &
Anthony Giddens eds., 2000) (noting that markets are considered superior in all regards compared to
government and that markets foreclose the need for social justice programs).
124. See Margot E. Salomon, Why Should it Matter that Others Have More?—Poverty, Inequality and
the Potential of International Human Rights Law 2 (London Sch. Econ. & Political Sci., Law Dep’t, Law,
Soc’y & Econ., Working Paper No. 15, 2010), available at http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/law/wps/
WPS2010-15_Salomon.pdf.
125. NEVE GORDON, FROM THE MARGINS OF GLOBALIZATION, CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON HUMAN
RIGHTS 8 (2004).
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world or blameworthy neighborhoods in our communities, notwithstanding the
lessons of critical theory.
B. Addressing the Failure to Merge Critical Theory with Critical Practice
Critical legal theory has attempted to mediate the power dynamics between
poverty and civil rights lawyers and clients. For example, practitioners have
considered ways to shift from paradigmatic individual case/litigation strategies to
legal work that is grounded in community alliances and grassroots networks.126
However, even as the influence of critical legal theory expanded, especially
through the late 1980s, and with greater attention on issues of systemic
discrimination and framing of civil rights as human rights, traditional poverty
lawyering continues to struggle with a top-down provision of legal services to
individuals in need. Local programs suffer from a lack of shared long-term
vision, bureaucracy, quality controls, and productivity measures that often fail to
meaningfully engage and involve clients.127
Poverty lawyers continue to grapple with these issues, particularly in the
provision of individual services, where the isolation of legal services organiza-
tions from the communities they serve often perpetuates the top-down service
delivery model. In addition, a legal services organization’s focus on professional-
ism, together with limitations on the types of legal practice permitted under
funding rules and the lack of a clear, comprehensive vision for productive
community involvement, has channeled much of the work of legal services
lawyers into the courts instead of the communities. Race, class, and other
divisions between lawyers and the community members they serve have
historically existed, and continue to exist today.
In many areas, critical legal theory, and more specifically, critical race theory
analyses, did not seep into the legal practices mode in any sustained or
comprehensive fashion. This failure is not a critique of legal services organiza-
tions alone, which aim to meet ever-increasing legal needs of individuals in local
communities. Much critical theory has been and remains inaccessible to the
poverty lawyers it criticizes.128 “Failure to attend to those engaged ‘on the
ground’ is one reason for the mismatch between theory and practice.”129 As a
result, critical theory and literature, including that regarding structural conditions
126. Eduardo R.C. Capulong, Client Activism in Progressive Lawyering Theory, 16 CLINICAL L. REV
109, 118 (2009).
127. Alan Houseman, The War on Poverty, 83 GEO. L.J. 1669, 1688-1708 (1995).
128. Blasi, supra note 72, at 1087 (“[A]s currently constituted . . . the ‘new poverty law scholarship’
suffers from flaws that prevent it from being of much practical consequence for poverty law
practice . . . . Never has so much theory rested on so little practice. The total factual content of all of this
scholarship consists of perhaps a dozen remembered episodes about individual clients in the former
practices of the respective authors.”).
129. COREY SHDAIMAH, NEGOTIATING JUSTICE: PROGRESSIVE LAWYERING, LOW-INCOME CLIENTS, AND
THE QUEST FOR SOCIAL CHANGE xiii (2009).
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that enable the persistence of poverty, has been divorced from the everyday
practice of poverty law. As Michelle Jacobs has observed, since clinical legal
education developed partially as a reflection of the legal services model of
lawyering, deficiencies and challenges facing poverty lawyers in legal services
offices are likely to exist in law school clinics as well.130
Perhaps most notable among the ongoing critiques of traditional poverty
lawyering is that, while aimed at a fundamental but unrealized ideal in the legal
services structure, critique focused on developing an attorney-client relationship
premised on a mutual respect and responsibility between attorney and client. This
ideal is challenging to achieve in practice and requires both a systemic vision and
lawyering practice that focuses on relationship-building and personal investment
of time and attention in a local community. It also requires attorneys to develop
and maintain viewpoints on lawyering that may deviate from mainstream ideas
about the lawyer’s traditional role.131 Even then, issues such as race, class,
gender, and systemic power are paramount—and must be navigated and
negotiated as lawyers seek to practice in a way that does not perpetuate a
top-down model. In particular, the concept of client autonomy in an attorney-
client relationship is burdened by a variety of limitations even when the attorney
and client are committed together on a path of risk and uncertainty—after all, any
negative result of that risk impacts the two in vastly different ways.
C. Examples from Clinical Practice
For us as teachers and practitioners, the conceptual concerns addressed above
imply entering into the realm of praxis to better understand the challenges they
raise for our pedagogy and for our methods of practice in the different fora where
we work. These concerns affect our relationships with clients and communities,
and are no less serious for those of us engaged in practicing and teaching in the
domestic social justice field. We collectively have found it is often in the context
of a law school clinical setting where these persistent dilemmas manifest
themselves most starkly, and where we have an opportunity to engage in a
deliberate self-reflective analysis about the complexities of carrying out our work
and the purposes for which we put critical theory into practice.
1. Brief Background: The Work of Human Rights Clinics
Since they came into existence in the 1990s, human rights clinics in the United
States have traditionally focused the majority of their work on human rights
130. Jacobs, supra note 71, at 352.
131. See, e.g., John O. Calmore, “Chasing the Wind”: Pursuing Social Justice, Overcoming Legal
Mis-Education, and Engaging in Professional Re-Socialization, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1167 (2004); Shin
Imai, A Counter-Pedagogy for Social Justice: Core Skills for Community-Based Lawyering, 9 CLINICAL
L. REV. 195 (2002).
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problems outside of the United States.132 Clinic projects varied from representa-
tion of individuals before human rights bodies (regional commissions, interna-
tional courts, ad hoc international tribunals, United Nations treaty bodies), to
writing human rights reports in the style of (and sometimes in collaboration with)
Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and others, to representing
foreign-born individuals in asylum claims before U.S. immigration courts or in
Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) cases against foreign dictators, corporations, and
other “human rights bad guys” before U.S. federal courts.133 Periodically, human
rights clinics dabbled in cases and projects oriented toward the enforcement of
human rights against the United States,134 but historically, clinical instructors
usually eschewed such initiatives, in light of the United States’ failure to ratify
most international human rights treaties and its refusal to subject itself to scrutiny
before international human rights bodies.135 This was perhaps a practical
pedagogic response to a concrete reality, but it also served to reinforce the notion
(to students, amongst others) that the United States was “above” the scrutiny of
international law. Moreover, it sent a message to students that human rights
lawyering and advocacy had a “fly-in, fly-out” quality to it—and that carried
along with it all of the top-down baggage explored in greater detail above.
While human rights clinicians may have felt constrained geographically, many,
in contrast to clinicians in other areas of the law, populated their dockets with
cases and projects that might be characterized by a lack of normative constraints.
The aspirational nature of the human rights norms expressed in the International
Bill of Rights and other more recently drafted international and regional human
rights instruments made for meaty clinic projects. As recent conceptual develop-
ments, the treaty provisions needed analysis and application. Human rights
clinics routinely seized the opportunities to take on cases of first impression, and
to push for expansive interpretations of principles that incorporated language far
more progressive, in many circumstances, than U.S. law.
132. Arturo J. Carillo, Bringing International Law Home: The Innovative Role of Human Rights
Clinics in the Transnational Legal Process, 35 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 527 (2004); Deena R. Hurwitz,
Lawyering for Justice and the Inevitability of International Human Rights Clinics, 28 YALE J. INT’L L.
505, 526 (2003). For an overview of the structure and methodology of the first human rights clinic in the
United States (the International Human Rights Law Clinic at American University Washington College
of Law), see Richard J. Wilson, Clinical Legal Education for Human Rights Advocates, in HUMAN RIGHTS
EDUCATION FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 261-277 (George Andreopoulos & Richard Pierre Claude
eds., 1997).
133. The authors of this Article informally polled human rights clinics based in the United States, and
learned that while the trend is shifting, many clinics still include as a large part of their dockets cases and
projects arising from human rights violations outside the United States.
134. See, e.g., BRANDT GOLDSTEIN, STORMING THE COURT: HOW A BAND OF YALE LAW STUDENTS SUED
THE PRESIDENT—AND WON (2005) (describing a case brought by Yale’s Lowenstein International Human
Rights Clinic on behalf of Haitian asylum seekers; the case was brought on constitutional law grounds but
infused with human rights principles).
135. Cynthia Soohoo, Human Rights and the Transformation of the ‘Civil Rights’and ‘Civil Liberties’
Lawyer, in 2 BRINGING HUMAN RIGHTS HOME 71-93 (Cynthia Soohoo, Catherine Albisa & Martha F.
Davis eds., 2008).
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Human rights clinicians enthusiastically pursued developing a set of norms
under international law, and indeed had notable success.136 This group of
clinicians focused on addressing an urgent set of problems with an exciting new
set of tools that, for many, reflected their own moral and political codes. But
without serious reflection on the structures left unchallenged in some forms of
human rights advocacy (an area that is often criticized for prioritizing the
development of norms over a client-centered perspective), these clinicians risked
replicating the discriminatory or unfair structures they sought to eradicate. There
was also the more obvious and practical problem of the efficacy of human rights
strategies, of the lack of respect that human rights regimes commanded in the
world political order, and especially at the domestic level in many countries.
2. Brief Background: The Work of Poverty Law Clinics
Poverty law clinics emerged as the dominant clinic law school model during
the 1970s.137 They were created to provide students with a broad range of
practical legal experiences and skills, as well as provide students with a chance to
learn social justice concepts while providing much-needed legal services to poor
clients who lacked access to justice.138 These clinics endeavored to provide
services in a holistic manner.139
The law school clinical model, with a heavy focus on poverty law clinics,
continued to develop while traditional legal services organizations experienced
increasing limitations on allowable practice and access to funding.140 Receptive
federal courts, together with a growing body of civil rights laws and associated,
enforceable remedies, fueled the development of the clinical movement. As these
dynamics have shifted and restrictions have grown, social justice and poverty law
clinics and practitioners are increasingly incorporating human rights language,
strategies, and claims in their work with poor clients and community organiza-
tions. As lawyers operating in the domestic realm, poverty law clinicians are
attracted to the “newness” of the human rights approach and the exciting
opportunities it provides for reframing what had previously been considered civil
rights and domestic issues, particularly as domestic courts and legal rhetoric have
become increasingly inhospitable to many claims advanced by the most
136. See, e.g., Hurwitz, supra note 132, at 539-48 (2003); Richard J. Wilson et al., The Work of the
International Human Rights Law Clinic at American University: Twelve Years of Operation, AM. UNIV.
WASH. COLL. LAW (May 2002), http://www.wcl.american.edu/clinical/annual_2002.pdf?rd_1.
137. Kimberly E. O’Leary, Clinical Law Offices and Local Social Justice Strategies: Case Selection
and Quality Assessment as an Integral Part of the Social Justice Agenda of Clinics, 11 CLINICAL L. REV.
335, 337 n.8 (citing Antoinette Sedillo Lopez).
138. Fran Quigley, Seizing the Disorienting Moment: Adult Learning Theory and the Teaching of
Social Justice in Law School Clinics, 2 CLINICAL L. REV. 37, 38 (1995).
139. Antoinette Sedillo Lopez, Learning Through Service in a Clinical Setting: The Effect of
Specialization on Social Justice and Skills Training, 7 CLINICAL L. REV. 307, 317 (2001).
140. See supra Part II.
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vulnerable among us—persons displaced by catastrophe, undocumented domes-
tic workers, the disabled and uninsured, and others. As with international and
transnational focused clinical projects, however, the incorporation of a human
rights framework has not necessarily led to a more client-centered, non-
hierarchical lawyering approach. Indeed, the challenges chronicled above apply
with equal force to this new area of poverty law practice.
As poverty lawyers, poverty law clinicians are also concerned that emphasiz-
ing human rights claims in traditional domestic poverty work may raise
additional concerns that warrant critical reflection and analysis. The undertaking
may be very attractive to the lawyers and clinical students who have the
opportunity to employ new legal strategies and develop and test new legal
theories. However, cases and projects that are undertaken without sufficient
consideration of the amorphous, symbolic, and often unenforceable nature of the
human rights remedy may leave clients with little by way of concrete relief.141
3. Clinical Case Studies
The following are examples of cases and projects undertaken in our law school
clinical programs. They serve to highlight the tensions, indeterminacies, and
synchronicities that exist in our respective international and transnational human
rights clinics and in our domestic poverty and community lawyering clinics. In
reflecting on these case studies through the lens of critical theory, we raise more
questions than answers. Specifically, critical theory calls on us to inquire how, in
our individual client representation, we can avoid client victimization and
address the broader socio-economic and political factors underlying the client’s
search for relief. In our broader human rights impact work, critical theory
highlights the need for a broader understanding and a more systemic challenge to
the immediately apparent rights violations. And, when seeking to apply
international human rights norms domestically, we are called upon to navigate
the relationships between the client communities and the professional advocates
in pursuit of a shared strategy, while at the same time, being mindful of the
limitations of a human rights strategy to meet the immediate needs of the client
community. Our final case study raises concerns of the unintended consequences
of our human rights advocacy, and we must constantly reflect, assess, and adjust
as we strive to work collaboratively with our clients in achieving their ultimate
goals. Taken together, these case studies, and others interspersed throughout this
Article, also illustrate the interconnectedness of our fields (poverty, community,
and human rights lawyering) and challenge us to locate these types of lawyering
both at home and abroad.
141. For example, see infra Part III(C)(3)(d) for case study detailing a human rights strategy that was
utilized in 2009 on behalf of uninsured immigrants in the greater Atlanta region.
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a. Representing Immigrants with U Visa/Asylum Cases: Individualized
Domestic Advocacy Addressing Human Rights Violations Abroad
The Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act (VTVPA) of 2000
included a new form of immigration relief that may provide legal status to
undocumented immigrant victims of crimes if they have suffered substantial
physical or mental abuse as a result of the crime, and if they have helped law
enforcement officials investigate or prosecute the crime.142 An additional
element of the U visa case is the requirement to establish hardship to the client if
she were to be returned to her home country.143
Advocates increasingly include escalating and brutal violence in Mexico
associated with the drug cartel wars as an important factor that weighs in favor of
proving hardship in U visa cases. Furthermore, advocates are now representing
increasing numbers of Mexicans who seek asylum because of the fear of violence
and reprisals relating to drug war violence.144 The immediate goal is to assemble
a strong case based on the horrendous circumstances unfolding in Mexico on
behalf of clients who are seeking protection from individual and collective forms
of repression.
Atrocities, systematic decapitations, and charred bodies, all apparent byprod-
ucts of the drug wars, are part of the daily news.145 As evidence of our clients’
claims, a typical submission might be journalistic accounts of the violence with
headlines that read, “The Drug War at our Doorstep”146 or “Mexico Under Siege:
Families Want Answers from Man Who Says He Dissolved 300 People,”147 as
well as State Department reports that describe the brutal violence.148
Due to the constraints of the legal structures within which these claims are
developed, we necessarily omit from U visa and asylum narratives the historical
and structural determinants of Mexico’s drug war, particularly those that
implicate U.S. policies as contributing to drug trade violence. For example, facts
setting forth the relationship between the drug violence in Mexico and the
142. Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101 (West 2011); see
also Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1551-1552 (West 2011).
143. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.58(c) (2011); see Gail Pendleton, Overcoming Inadmissibility for U Visa
Applicants, available at www.asistahelp.org/. . ./Overcoming_Inadmissibility_C3C0CAF47A2F8.doc.
144. Andrew Becker & Patrick J. McDonnell , Drug War Creates New Class of Refugees, L.A. TIMES,
Mar. 9, 2009, http://articles.latimes.com/2009/mar/04/nation/na-asylum4.
145. Mark Lacey, With Force, Mexican Drug Cartels Get Their Way, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2009;
Richard Marosi, Mexico under Siege, Mystery Man Blamed for Gruesome Tijuana Deaths, L.A. TIMES,
Dec. 18, 2008.
146. Mexico Under Siege: The Drug War at Our Doorstep, L.A. TIMES, available at http://projects.
latimes.com/mexico-drug-war/#/its-a-war (last visited Apr. 13, 2011).
147. Richard Marosi, Mexico Under Siege: Families Want Answers From Man Who Says He Dissolved 300
People, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 9. 2009, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2009/feb/09/world/fg-missing9.
148. 2009 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: MEXICO, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Mar. 11, 2010), http://www.state.gov/
g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/wha/136119.htm.
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aftermath of the Washington Consensus are not addressed.149 That tens of
thousands of displaced workers have moved into drug-trade related activities as a
consequence of NAFTA has no apparent relevance in these cases.150 The U.S.
trade in guns and the U.S. demand for drugs as factors that contribute to drug violence
in Mexico, as well as the knowledge that the perpetrators of some of the most brutal acts
of criminal violence include U.S.-trained elite members of the Mexican armed
forces, are also not relevant to U visa cases or in asylum proceedings.151
The following questions therefore have surfaced from our work on such cases:
(1) what are the broader socioeconomic-political determinants at play that we
want to teach our students to educate them about the context in which these cases
arise, and (2) how would addressing those broader sociopolitical determinants
affect our lawyering, or would they? What can we do in the individual client
representation that seeks to incorporate that broader context in our overarching
strategy, and how can we challenge the problematic Savage-Victim-Savior
narrative?
b. Gender Violence in Mexico and Guatemala: Looking for Room to Apply
Critical Theory in Systemic Advocacy Addressing Human Rights Violations
Outside the United States
As described above, human rights practitioners not only represent individuals
who suffer rights violations, but also often work in the realm of cause lawyering
and policy to develop reports, manuals, and best legal practice guides pertaining
to human rights. One example of such a policy project involved the development
of a best legal practices guide to prevent and respond to domestic violence in
Mexico and Guatemala.152 The project was initiated at the request of a
nongovernmental organization in the United States in coalition with human rights
advocacy groups in Mexico and Guatemala. Clinic students developed two
policy papers on best practices: the first relating to advocacy, law enforcement
and judicial responses to domestic violence, and the second relating to
evidentiary concerns in sexual abuse cases. The request for the project was in
response to the recent epidemic of increased domestic violence and killings of
women in Cuidad Juárez and the urban areas of Guatemala.
149. Laura Carlsen, Armoring NAFTA: The Battleground for Mexico’s Future, in NACLA REPORT ON
THE AMERICAS 17 (2008), available at https://nacla.org/files/A04105017_1.pdf.
150. EDUARDO ZEPEDA ET. AL, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, RETHINKING TRADE
POLICY FOR DEVELOPMENT: LESSONS FROM MEXICO UNDER NAFTA (2009), available at http://www.
ase.tufts.edu/gdae/Pubs/rp/CarnegieNAFTADec09.pdf.
151. ENRIQUE DUSSEL PETERS, POLARIZING MEXICO: THE IMPACT OF LIBERALIZATION STRATEGY 68
(2000); Todd Miller, Mexico: Corporate Hit Men Find New Ways to Turn a Profit, N. AM. CONG. ON LATIN
AM. (Jan. 20, 2010), https://nacla.org/node/6369.
152. In 2006, the UNC Immigration/Human Rights Policy Clinic collaborated with the Washington
Office on Latin America to produce a report on a best practices guide pertaining to legal intervention in
gender-based violence matters in cooperation with NGOs in Mexico and Guatemala. Report on file with
authors.
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Students were immersed in the details of feminicidio, rape, and domestic
violence cases. They read through Special Rapporteur and human rights reports
describing the impunity characterizing the state’s response to crimes against
women. They collected best practices and commentary from various programs in
the United States, international ad hoc tribunals, developing practices from the
International Criminal Court, and protocols from several other Latin American
and European countries. The end product was both specific and comprehensive,
and addressed all realms of legal intervention in these matters.
Not addressed were the historical and structural sources of gender crimes. Not
addressed was the impact of structural adjustment program directives and the
North American Free Trade Agreement, as factors that contributed to the exodus
of the unemployed to Cuidad Juárez and the diminished capacity of the Mexican
government to respond to the unraveling of the city’s social fabric.153 Not
addressed was the history of Guatemala’s intermittent violence with its anteced-
ents in the CIA-sponsored coup in 1954.154 Not addressed were the deaths and
disappearances of the hundreds of thousands of Guatemalans during the period of
civil war following the coup, a quarter of whom were women.155
Introducing the historical and political complexities of Mexico’s drug violence
or the murders of women provides students with the opportunity to problematize
how rights abuses are shaped by existing power relationships.156 Examining the
gender violence in Guatemala as a historically-specific social process in which
the United States is implicated, particularly where it endeavored to thwart the
prospect of socio-economic reforms, creates opportunities for a politically radical
discourse.157 Classroom discussions and reading assignments that go beyond the
formalistic structures of the case aid the goals of teaching critical thinking about
lawyering.158 This expands the teaching of law from a set of technological skills
153. Deborah M. Weissman, The Political Economy of Violence: Toward an Understanding of the
Gender-Based Murders of Ciudad Juárez, 30 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COMM. REG. 795, 843-848 (2005).
154. Deborah M. Weissman, Global Economics and Their Progenies: Theorizing Femicide in
Context, in TERRORIZING WOMEN, FEMICIDE IN THE AMERICAS 225, 228-230 (Rosa-Linda Fregoso &
Cynthia Bejarano eds., 2010).
155. Rape and sexual violence were integral parts of the strategy to destroy civil resistance. Id.
156. See Neve Gordon, Introduction: Human Rights as Being-Marginal-in-the-World, in FROM THE
MARGINS OF GLOBALIZATION, CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON HUMAN RIGHTS 8 (Neve Gordon ed., 2004)
(noting that human rights are informed by compassion and an obligation to oppose hierarchical power
relations); Benson et al., supra note 114, at 40 (arguing in support of the goal of “resocial[izing]” human
rights violations by “tracing their origins to sociopolitical and economic conditions”).
157. Mark Goodale, Locating Rights, Envisioning Law Between the Global and the Local, in THE
PRACTICE OF HUMAN RIGHTS: TRACKING LAW BETWEEN THE GLOBAL AND THE LOCAL 1, 27 (Mark Goodale
& Sally Engle Merry eds., 2007); Schlag, supra note 51, at 296.
158. See Nisha Agarwal & Jocelyn Simonson, Thinking Like a Public Interest Lawyer: Theory,
Practice and Pedagogy, 34 N.Y.U. REV. OF LAW & SOCIAL CHANGE 455 (2010) (referring to “‘critical
reflective ethics through practice’”); Juliet M. Brodie, Little Cases On The Middle Ground: Teaching
Social Justice Lawyering in Neighborhood-Based Community Lawyering Clinics, 15 CLINICAL L. REV.
333, 334 (2009) (describing how to achieve the goals of clinical education: “service and teaching, social
justice and pedagogy”).
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to a multidisciplinary approach that includes sociology and politics.159
Expanding our discussions with clients to include theories about the larger
circumstances of their experiences with violence provides an opportunity for
meaningful consideration of long-term solutions.160 A fuller exchange of
information beyond eliciting the specific facts for their individual cases enables
clients to assess whether the truncated narratives employed on their behalf may
exacerbate anti-immigrant sentiments and contribute to sensationalized accounts
of violent Mexicans.161
The limitations of client-specific cases can be offset by working with grassroots
initiatives and transnational advocacy networks, some of whom offer an alternative
discourse about drug violence in Mexico or gender violence in the region.162 And
while directly presenting these ideas to case adjudicators may be problematic for
individual-level advocacy and zealous client representation, human rights
advocates can act in the capacity of public intellectual to disseminate their ideas
in scholarly works, newspaper opinion columns, and other public forums. We
continually reflect, however, and encourage our students to do so, on what it
means in such projects to adopt a client-centered approach to lawyering, as well
as consider whose interests are furthered by this sort of expansive advocacy.
c. Gulf Coast Hurricanes and Public Housing in New Orleans:
The Challenges and Limitations of Using International Human
Rights in Domestic Community Lawyering
The 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes Katrina and Rita and the aftermath of disaster
justice issues that followed brought a notable resurgence in domestic advocates’
use of international human rights norms. Social movement focus and activity on
housing justice issues in New Orleans was anchored to a particular struggle over
the post-disaster demolition of public housing. More than 5,000 units of public
housing in the “Big 4” public housing communities were at stake.163 The
demographics of pre-hurricane public housing heavily favored African-
159. See FRANK UPHAM, MYTHMAKING IN THE RULE OF LAW ORTHODOXY 8 (2002).
160. See Robert Ashford, Eliminating the Underlying Cause of Poverty as a Means to Global
Economic Recovery, (Syracuse Univ., Coll. of Law Faculty Scholarship, Working Paper No. 8, 2010),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_1583653 (arguing that it is the highest duty of a lawyer to address
clients’ most immediate problems, but also to address fundamental, systemic causes of and solutions to
such issues).
161. James C. McKinley, Jr., Fleeing Drug Violence, Mexicans Pour Into the U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
18, 2010, at A1 (noting unsubstantiated suggestions that Mexicans entering the United States were fleeing
from Mexico because they were participating in drug cartel violence and now fear rival cartel revenge).
162. Mexico News and Analysis, MEXICO SOLIDARITY NETWORK, Aug. 2-8, 2010, available at
http://www.mexicosolidarity.org/post/2010/august/mexiconewsandanalysisaugust282010 (reporting that
drug violence has decreased and warning against a reductive interpretation of drug violence).
163. See Gwen Filosa, Demolition is Development’s Destiny, TIMES PICAYUNE, Oct. 18, 2006, at
National 1; Susan Saulny, 5,000 Public Housing Units in New Orleans are to be Razed, N.Y. TIMES, June
15, 2006, at A1.
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Americans (99%) and women.164 The movement to save public housing sought to
stop the demolitions and when that effort failed, focused demands on replacing
one-for-one demolished units and gaining input from displaced public housing
residents on the proposed redevelopments. Eventually, the redevelopment of
newer, less dense mixed-income housing to replace demolished public housing
included far fewer affordable units.165
Local organizing and advocacy efforts focused on the benefits of a disaster
response governed by human rights such as the UN Guiding Principles on
Internal Displacement, which guarantee post-disaster shelter along with the
dignified treatment of displaced persons.166 Efforts to frame the disasters
according to the protections of the Guiding Principles highlighted failures of the
U.S. government’s domestic disaster response under the Stafford Act and
bolstered the domestic Gulf South grassroots’ movement for displaced per-
sons.167 While the United States chose not to utilize this human rights framework
in its disaster policy, the broad-based protections of the Guiding Principles led
key movement demands: the right to return for all displaced persons, and just and
equitable reconstruction with a focus on race, class, and gender.
Professional advocates, local and national, explicitly introduced human rights
concepts to bolster demands for housing justice by providing information and
training on use of the Guiding Principles in a top-down fashion. The experiences
of displaced people informed popular education, grassroots organizing, local and
regional trainings, and countless discussions at community meetings over the
post-hurricane years. Formal human rights mechanisms were also utilized in
hurricane-impacted communities to document and raise awareness about post-
disaster housing barriers, including shadow reports, Special Rapporteur visits,
tribunals, and use of the Universal Periodic Review process.168 The human rights
framework proved to be a strong organizing mechanism exposing policy
inequities and disaster capitalism that left poor people worse off in terms of
housing justice.
Social justice lawyers allied with those in the public housing movement aimed
to develop a collaborative model of lawyering alongside impacted community
members. The movement included lawyers working to build political power
outside of the courtroom in, for example, community meetings and protests, and
164. See Jane M. Henrici et al., Mounting Losses: Women and Public Housing After Hurricane
Katrina, INST. FOR WOMEN’S POLICY RESEARCH FACT SHEET D491 (Aug. 2010), http://iwpr.org/pdf/
D491.pdf.
165. HANO, Total Units Scheduled to be Available by Dec. 2010 (on file with the author).
166. U.N. Office of Humanitarian Affairs, U.N. Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (1998),
available at http://www.brookings.edu/fp/projects/idp/resources/GPsEnglish.pdf.
167. See, e.g., U.S. Disaster Response Law vs. Human Rights Standards on Internal Displacement,
ADVOCATES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS, available at http://www.ehumanrights.org/ourwork_
residents_USDRLvHRS.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2011).
168. See Advisory Group on Forced Evictions in New Orleans & UN Advocacy Documents, NAT’L
LAW CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, available at http://wiki.nlchp.org/display/Manual/
New"Orleans"and"Gulf"Coast (last visited Apr 15, 2011).
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through demands on public officials and advocacy with government policymak-
ers. During this process, lawyers straddled the needs of clients who had lost their
housing and the collective call of the social movement with which they were
involved.
With a mindfully directed “community lawyering” approach, attorneys
grappled with power dynamics that favored lawyers’ choices; their own limited
ability to control needed resources such as housing and funds for former public
housing residents; challenges of enabling resident leadership in the movement;
and entrenched structural conditions at every turn. Even reflecting on circum-
stances and relationships from the lawyer’s perspective alone might draw
attention away from an authentic client-centered approach. This collaborative
process was complex with new needs constantly emerging and a wide range of
involvement in the movement. Lessons learned point to the necessity of ongoing,
critical self-reflection with close attention on power dynamics and the multilay-
ered struggles of impacted community members that lawyers are not likely to
experience themselves. As described above, mobilizing community action is a
long-term process. Though former public housing residents and lawyers were
tethered together, the kind of leverage needed to realize post-disaster housing
justice was not easily achieved.
Eventually, lawyers filed a federal class action suit to try to halt the
demolitions.169 Notably, that complaint brought a claim under international law
and specifically UN Guiding Principle 28 explaining that, “the United States
must allow internally displaced persons to return voluntarily, in safety and with
dignity, to their homes or places of habitual residence.”170 The filing of the
lawsuit seemed to refocus the movement’s attention and/or coincided with
shifting movement efforts. The legal case became a focal point, possibly drawing
energy away from organizing efforts. Lawyers’ energies were increasingly
focused on meeting the needs of individual clients and class members, and on
litigating the case.
The suit to save public housing clearly demonstrated some limits with the
power of traditional litigation. With no domestic right to housing or meaningful
political commitment to the plight of the most vulnerable post-Katrina residents,
the federal court, at the urging of the federal and local housing agencies, allowed
the demolitions to proceed. The national policy geared toward mixed income
redevelopment, preconditioned on scattering residents and severing social
networks, prevailed. Some residents were never able to return home—not even to
return belongings and personal possessions before their apartments were
bulldozed. As of this writing, approximately 2,600 affordable units in New
Orleans were occupied and urgent housing needs for many thousands remained
169. Anderson v. Jackson, No. 06-3298, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9074 (E.D. La. Feb. 6, 2007).
170. Id. at *12; U.N. Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE OF
HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS No. 28(1998), available at http://www.brookings.edu/fp/projects/idp/resources/
GPsEnglish.pdf.
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unmet.171 Once the demolitions were authorized and completed, the ongoing
litigation was not an effective focal point for the movement.172
The guarantees of the Guiding Principles, even when coupled with strong
movement organizing, could not provide displaced persons with necessary short
or long term housing relief following the hurricanes. Lack of enforceability of the
relevant human rights norms was at odds with displaced persons’ urgency for
immediate safe and affordable shelter. This amplified a basic tension with
pursuing human rights in the United States. Without government acceptance and
commitment to enforcement and oversight, the visionary Guiding Principles
could not offer hurricane survivors the realization of decent post-disaster
housing.
There is an implicit understanding that grassroots movements require time to
build capacity and develop effective strategies and tactics for sustainable social
change. Thus, the momentum generated from extensive post-disaster movement
efforts cannot be measured exclusively in terms of immediate benefit for
individuals or changes in domestic disaster policies. The human rights frame-
work offered a long-term vision and promise, provided those most impacted by
the hurricanes a departure point for discourse and demands, and crucially,
allowed displaced persons (and their advocates) a measure of hope.
As community lawyers, we struggled with the following issues: (1) how do we
achieve balance between litigation and non-litigation advocacy techniques within
the frame of human rights, (2) how can community lawyering that incorporates
the frame of human rights best serve the interests of clients with urgent needs and
social movement capacity building; (3) how does the human rights framework
serve to build local social movement capacity in the context of domestic justice
issues; and (4) why do we, or do we at all, want to encourage our disenfranchised
clients to adopt a human rights framework to address the myriad of problems they
face?
d. Denial of Funding for Dialysis Treatment for Immigrants in Miami:
Questioning the Value of an International Human Rights Strategy
in Domestic Poverty Lawyering
In Miami, Florida, the Health and Elder Law Clinic struggled with the question
of whether, and how, to incorporate a human rights strategy in its representation
of poor immigrants with end-stage renal failure whose very survival depended on
ongoing access to dialysis treatments. On August 22, 1996, the United States
Congress enacted the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconcilia-
171. HANO Occupancy Report (Jan. 31, 2011) (on file with the author).
172. In 2011, the lawsuit was still pending on non-demolition issues. See Anderson v. Jackson, No.
06-3298, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9074 (E.D. La. Feb. 6, 2007), Order and Reasons, Apr. 5, 2011.
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tion Act (PRWORA).173 The Act barred many “qualified”174 and all “non-
qualified” immigrants and non-immigrants from receiving most means-tested
federal public benefits, including virtually all safety-net programs for the poor
such as Medicaid, Medicare and Social Security Supplemental Income.175 The
only exception permitting use of federal Medicaid funds for this population is
through the limited emergency Medicaid program.176 Emergency for these
purposes is defined as a:
[M]edical condition (including emergency labor and delivery) manifesting
itself by acute symptoms of sufficient severity (including severe pain) such that
the absence of immediate medical attention could reasonably be expected result
in—(A) placing the patient’s health in serious jeopardy,(B) serious impairment
to bodily functions, or (C) serious dysfunction of any bodily organ or part.177
States and localities were left to shoulder the burden of providing unqualified
immigrants medical care out of their own funds, often at great expense, or to
choose to deny immigrants life-sustaining and medically necessary treatment.178
In 2010, the public health care system in Miami-Dade County terminated its
provision of outpatient dialysis for the poor.179 The Health and Elder Law Clinic,
along with local legal services agencies, worked to address this crisis through
negotiating a streamlined emergency Medicaid application procedure with State
officials and by conducting an intensive screening of each individual whose
173. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, 21 U.S.C. § 862a
(2000).
174. Qualified aliens, defined in § 431 of PRWORA, as amended, include: 1) Aliens lawfully admitted
for permanent residence under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 USC 1101 et seq.; 2)
Refugees, admitted under § 207 of the INA; 3) Aliens granted asylum under § 208 of the IN; 4) Cuban
and Haitian Entrants, as defined in § 501(e) of the Refugee Education Assistance Act of 1980; 5) Aliens
granted parole for at least one year under § 212(d)(5) of the INA; 6) Aliens whose deportation is being
withheld under (1) § 243(h) of the INA as in effect prior to April 1, 1997; or (2) § 241(b)(3) of the INA, as
amended; 7) Aliens granted conditional entry under § 203(a)(7) of the INA in effect before April 1, 1980;
8) Battered aliens, who meet the conditions set forth in § 431(c) of PRWORA, as added by § 501 of the
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, P.L. 104-208 (IIRIRA), and
amended by § 5571 of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, P.L. 105-33 (BBA), and § 1508 of the Violence
against Women Act of 2000, P.L. 106-386. Section 431(c) of PRWORA, as amended, is codified at 8 USC
1641(c); 9) Victims of a severe form of trafficking, in accordance with § 107(b)(1) of the Trafficking
Victims Protection Act of 2000, P.L. 106-386.
175. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1611 (“Means-tested federal public benefits are defined as: “any retirement, welfare,
health, disability, public or assisted housing, postsecondary education, food assistance, unemployment
benefit, or any other similar benefit for which payments or assistance are provided to an individual,
household, or family eligibility unit by an agency of the United States or by appropriated funds of the
United States.”).
176. 42 U.S.C. § 1396(b) (2010).
177. 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(v)(3) (2010).
178. Michelle Weinberg, et al., Migration, Law, and the Public’s Health, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 109
(2005).
179. Kevin Sack, Hospital Cuts Dialysis Care for the Poor in Miami, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2010.
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dialysis services were being terminated to determine whether they were eligible
for other insurance to pay for the services.
Our clinic was also mindful of the only other highly publicized occurrence of
termination of this care, also in the South. Only months before, the public health
care entity for the greater Atlanta region had announced that it would no longer
fund outpatient dialysis treatments for end-stage renal failure for uninsured
immigrants.180 In that case, we had watched as poverty lawyers filed a series of
unsuccessful challenges in state courts based on federal and state domestic law.
They then filed a petition requesting precautionary measures with the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), alleging human rights
violations.181
By many standards, this advocacy was a resounding success. The IACHR
issued precautionary measures under its Article 25 authority on behalf of “31
undocumented immigrants residing in Atlanta, Georgia.” The Commission asked
“the United States to instruct the competent authorities to take the urgent
measures necessary to ensure that the beneficiaries have access to the medical
treatment that may be required for their condition.”182 Despite this success, the
victory did not change the rights of the patients to life-sustaining treatment, and
several died after they were sent home from the hospital to Mexico.183
In Miami, when virtually the same action was taken by our public hospital, the
clinic originally thought to pursue the same strategy, and clinic students began to
draft an IACHR petition. Our efforts broke down in this regard for three reasons:
First, the clinic had developed a close attorney-client relationship with the
individuals we counseled and screened whose dialysis treatments were being
terminated. The clinic found it difficult to articulate to these clients a real benefit
in pursuing the human rights strategy, particularly if it diverted our already
over-extended legal resources down an avenue that we knew would not secure
any enforceable order for them to receive care.
Second, our clinic believed that raising international human rights violations,
going through the exercise of “naming and shaming” might poison our
relationship, and our clients’ relationships, with the very entities they depended
upon to survive. In this regard, the clinic made a calculated decision that we
would get further by negotiating procedures, and requesting assistance for
sympathetic individuals, than by making accusations of violation of human
rights.
180. Id.; see also Kevin Sack, Hospital Falters as Refuge for Illegal Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20,
2009.
181. Shelia M. Poole & Craig Schneider, Human Rights Group Looks at Grady Dialysis Clinic
Closure, ATLANTA J. CONST., Jan. 8, 2010, available at http://www.ajc.com/news/atlanta/human-rights-
group-looks-270874.html.
182. Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R. (PM) No. 385-09-31 (Jan. 29, 2010).
183. Kevin Sack & Catrin Einhorn, Deal Would Provide Dialysis to Illegal Immigrants in Atlanta,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2010.
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Third, the clinic became bogged down in the sheer size of the real enterprise.
Any honest assessment of why our clients were being deprived of their
life-sustaining care necessarily entailed attacking our entire federal welfare
scheme, and especially PRWORA, as a violation of human rights. To fail to raise
this seemed disingenuous. Yet, to raise it seemed too enormous an undertaking,
and one bound to become mired in process while our clients might die. One year
later, the clinic continues to struggle with these issues, and constantly re-weighs
the options, as the clinic and our clients go hat in hand to increasingly less
sympathetic and poorly funded social services agencies and healthcare providers
requesting the needed care.
e. Ethnic Individuals of Haitian Descent in the Dominican Republic:
The Unintended Consequences of Naming and Shaming and the Move
Toward Collaborative Transnational Human Rights Lawyering
Over the past three decades, the government of the Dominican Republic has,
on a regular and systematic basis, discriminated against Haitian immigrants and
Dominicans of Haitian descent living in the country. Such discrimination takes
the form of periodic collective roundups and mass expulsions of persons
presumed to be Haitian solely on the basis of their skin color and appearance, as
well as the denial of birth certificates to individuals born to parents of Haitian
origin.184
International attention from human rights groups to the situation of Haitian
migrants in the Dominican Republic emerged in the 1980s.185 Advocates focused
their efforts on shaming the Dominican Republic before the international
community and generating pressure through U.S. State Department human rights
country reports.186 Three cases focusing on Haitian rights were filed against the
Dominican Republic before the Inter-American Commission and Court of
Human Rights. In 2005, in the case Yean & Bosico Children v. The Dominican
Republic, the Inter-American Court found the Dominican government respon-
184. The 1937 Dominican Constitution granted citizenship to all individuals born in the Dominican
Republic, with the exception of those born to foreign diplomats or persons “in transit,” Constitución
Politica de la República Dominicana art. 11 (1937). Through a clever yet disingenuous interpretation of
this jus soli citizenship provision, the Dominican government has argued that in most cases, the “in
transit” exception applies to all individuals who entered or stayed in the country illegally, along with any
and all of their descendents. According to the United States State Department, in 2007, an estimated
600,000 to one million Dominicans of Haitian descent had been denied birth certificates and,
functionally, Dominican citizenship as a result of this policy. Dominican Republic Country Report on
Human Rights Practices 2007, U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT (Mar. 2008). In 2009, the Dominican Republic
amended its constitution to officially incorporate this interpretation of the “in transit” provision. See
Elizabeth Eames Roebling, Protests Surround New Constitution, IPS NEWS, Oct. 23, 2009, available at
http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews!48977.
185. See, e.g., MINORITY RIGHTS GROUP INTERNATIONAL, MIGRATION IN THE CARIBBEAN: HAITI, THE
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND BEYOND 11 (2003).
186. NATIONAL COALITION FOR HAITIAN REFUGEES, A TROUBLED YEAR: HAITIANS IN THE DOMINICAN
REPUBLIC 1 (1992).
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sible for racial discrimination in its citizenship policy, in violation of the
American Convention on Human Rights, and ordered the Dominican citizenship
law changed.187 Despite this international condemnation of the Dominican
Republic’s treatment of individuals of Haitian descent, the country’s citizenship
laws and policies have ironically become more restrictive, threatening to “further
entrench the problem of systematic discrimination identified by the [Inter-
American Court].”188 Moreover, the Dominican government has successfully
used the Court’s decision as an entrée for preaching nationalist rhetoric and
emphasizing the existence of an “international conspiracy” to undermine
Dominican sovereignty.189
American and Canadian law school professors and human rights clinics have
been involved in international human rights litigation, report-writing, and other
advocacy related to the plight of individuals of Haitian descent living in the
Dominican Republic for more than a decade. The work has presented exciting
opportunities for human rights advocacy, but this work also has had troubling
implications. What were the unintended real-life consequences for Dominico-
Haitians of a laudable human rights campaign designed to shame a government,
but which may have worked to the opposite effect? What lessons did the students
learn about the role of a human rights lawyer who flies in and out of a distant
island periodically to meet (often through a translator) with local partners and
clients, and does his/her best to stay abreast of local context in the interim? How
did students see themselves vis-à-vis clients and partners who, in most cases,
came from a different racial, ethnic, linguistic, geographic, and socio-economic
background than their North American representatives/partners? How did
students come to define their ethical responsibilities to the individuals identified
as “petitioners” in a case or as “victims” in a report? Was there (or could there be)
a conflict between the goals of the cause and the goals of client(s)? And was a
human rights shaming campaign the most effective or sensible response to the
counter-narrative offered by the Dominican government that, as a poor country
itself, the Dominican Republic was simply trying to develop sensible immigra-
tion measures (and, for that matter, was looking to the U.S. for inspiration)?
More recently, the Columbia Law School Human Rights Clinic, upon
reassessing its advocacy on this issue, considered how it might address the
187. The Yean and Bosico Children v. The Dominican Republic, Inter-Amer. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 130
(Sept. 8, 2005).
188. David C. Baluarte & Christian M. De Vos, From Judgment to Justice: Implementing
International and Regional Human Rights Decisions, OPEN SOCIETY FOUNDATIONS 70 (Nov. 2010),
available at http://www.soros.org/initiatives/justice/focus/international_justice/articles_publications/
publications/from-judment-to-justice20101122; Hurwitz, supra note 132, at 537 (describing how the
Dominican Republic reacted to the Boalt Law School International Human Rights Clinic’s advocacy on
the issue before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights by expelling between 5000 and
20,000 Haitian migrant workers and those suspected of being undocumented workers).
189. David C. Baluarte, Inter-American Justice Comes to the Dominican Republic: An Island Shakes
as Human Rights and Sovereignty Clash, 13 AM. U. HUM. RIGHTS BR. 25 (2006).
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Dominican government’s grievances that the international community was
unfairly picking on an easy target rather than focusing attention on the impact of
international trade and investment regimes of the world’s empires on small
developing countries, and on the migration crisis from Haiti to the Dominican
Republic. The clinic examined the practice of collective expulsions and violence
against ethnic Haitians in the border zone between the Dominican Republic and
Haiti from a foreign policy perspective, and learned that the United States was
partially funding, equipping, and training a new elite unit of the Dominican
Armed Forces, “CESFRONT,” whose mission was to secure the border between
the Dominican Republic and Haiti.190 Local NGOs in the two countries had
extensively documented human rights abuses committed or facilitated by
CESFRONT, including violence, corruption, and human trafficking.
The clinic is currently pursuing advocacy before the State Department and
Congress to draw attention to the human rights violations committed on the
border by this military force connected with the United States. Underscoring the
transnational dimension to the issue of mass expulsions and violence against
Haitians brought coherence to the advocacy, created new alliances between local
Dominican Republic-Haiti border NGOs, U.S. NGOs, and the Columbia Human
Rights Clinic. It also eased some of the political and strategic discomfort that
students and instructors alike had felt with a sole focus on the international
litigation against the Dominican Republic.
D. Observations
The concerns illuminated in the case studies may not be easily resolved within
the forums where we practice. The human rights systems within which we work
are formal legal systems.191 The nature of the legal claims sometimes seems to
foreclose the possibility of introducing the historical and structural questions,
particularly those that address U.S. complicity in human rights abuses. Similarly,
with regard to policy projects, human rights work often requires choices based on
resources and other realpolitik considerations, including the desire to achieve a
concrete and realizable goal.192 However, the knowledge that we omit from the
pages of our immigration applications and policy briefs must nonetheless be
broadly advanced through multi-dimensional forms of advocacy—in the class-
room, with our clients, with community allies, and in the public discourse
generally.
These case studies suggest that there will be no immediate answers forthcom-
ing or easy consensus achieved as to the causes of human rights violations or how
190. President of the Republic, Decreto No. 325-06, Que Crea el Cuerpo Especializad de Seguridad
Fronteriza Terrestre (CESFRONT), Dependiente de la Secretarı́a de Estado de las Fuerzas Armadas
(Aug. 8, 2006).
191. Goodale supra note 157, at 51.
192. Id. at 48.
No. 3] 377Redefining Human Rights Lawyering
to address them. But as one critical social theorist has noted, “CST in education
does not ask students to wait until answers to difficult social problems are
available to them before they critique them.”193 For human rights advocates to
constrain abuses, they must “consider the ways in which the knowledge they
produce is located in global networks of power.”194 The next section provides a
revised approach for teaching and practicing that may further the efforts to more
fully realize the lessons of critical theory.
IV. CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION AS A SITE FOR SHIFTING FROM
CIRCUMSTANCES TO STRUCTURE
It is indeed exciting that we have now come to this historical crossroads in
which many clinical disciplines are engaging with some form of human rights
work. Because clinics often serve as a laboratory for thought processes, analysis,
and the practical application of theory, a focus on clinics provides the opportunity
to set out and test guides, if not goals, for human rights lawyering generally.
Above we have reviewed the historical and present-day dilemmas engendered
by many forms of human rights lawyering and advocacy, particularly those led by
groups and individuals in the global North/West. Inspired by the lessons of
critical legal theory, as witness to many of our colleagues who have long
struggled with incorporating those lessons into their work, and in a quest to
further deepen our own understanding of those teachings, we propose a
self-reflective, goal-driven approach to clinical teaching and practice in human
rights work. We recognize this is an ongoing project, that no clinical discipline
has “mastered” a critical approach to its work, but in the spirit of engendering a
conversation between disciplines, we lay out here some lessons that we, as
poverty law, community lawyering, and human rights clinicians, can learn from
each other about how to strengthen our respective approaches to conducting
human rights work. In so doing, we are challenged to rethink the entire structure
of how we teach lawyering, from encouraging a rigorous practice of self-
reflective lawyering amongst our students and building a pedagogy around
teaching the genesis of human rights violations, to examining economic and
political processes, power relationships, and the mechanics of human rights
practice. At the end of this section, we offer some concrete lessons we have
learned in order to generate additional discussion about the teaching and practice
of human rights and social justice work in law school clinics.
193. Zeus Leonardo, Critical Social Theory and Transformative Knowledge: The Functions of
Criticism in Quality Education, 33 EDUC. RES. 11, 31 (2004).
194. Anne Orford, The Subject of Globalization: Economics, Identity and Human Rights, 94 AM SOC.
OF INT’L LAW PROC. 146, 148 (2000).
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A. Applying Critical Legal Theory to Ambivalent Advocacy
The process of questioning our assumptions about justice and advocacy
strategies, and challenging our methodologies, approaches, and class and project
design, is not easy, comfortable, or certain. How does one teach human rights
lawyering—an endeavor that Peter Rosenblum has described as “a realm of
advocacy tools, not abstract truths—a dynamic amalgam of norms, procedures,
and fora, full of tensions and contradictions”195—to clinic students? Because
human rights advocacy is a “process of strategic decision-making in a realm of
uncertainty,” Rosenblum’s pedagogic goal is to train “ambivalent advocates”—
that is, students who are “‘committed to action, but alert to the multiple
consequences’ that sometimes, though often unintentionally, accompany such
action as part of the advocacy strategy.”196
To be clear, our use of the term “ambivalent advocacy” does not imply that we
train our students to be ambivalent about a shared social justice mission of
alleviating human suffering. Rather, we encourage students to become comfort-
able when thinking about advocacy beyond the rigid legal frameworks in which
they have been immersed and beyond the trial paradigm they have been taught to
master, and instead to view human rights lawyering as a matrix that offers several
tools to make strategic decisions. Indeed, amongst clinicians, there appears to be
a growing recognition of the importance of encouraging students to “think
outside the trial paradigm and master the informal encounter.”197 It is with this
orientation toward teaching “ambivalent advocacy” that we reflect on the
previous set of case studies to suggest places where we may encounter ethical,
moral, and strategic “crossroads” in our work as clinicians, and how critical legal
theory may help us to navigate those crossroads to reflect our larger goals as
teachers, advocates, and scholars.
B. Lessons Learned Among Human Rights, Poverty Law, and Community
Lawyering Clinicians
Our initial impetus for beginning this project grew from the malaise amongst
the human rights clinicians among us with the dominant manner in which human
rights theory and practice has traditionally been conducted and taught to future
generations of lawyers in the United States. It seemed that human rights
195. Peter Rosenblum, Teaching Human Rights: Ambivalent Activism, Multiple Discourses, and
Lingering Dilemmas, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 301, 305 (2002).
196. Hurwitz, supra note 132, at 537 (citing Rosenblum, supra note 195, at 304-05).
197. Mark Aaronson, Michele Pistone, Jayesh Rathod, & Meetali Jain, Colloquium, Thinking Outside
the Trial Paradigm: Mastering the Informal Encounter, at AALS Clinical Conference (May 2009). In the
session, the presenters also discussed the work of Leah Christensen, who distinguishes between
“performance-oriented” learning in law schools and “mastery-oriented” learning, stating that the latter
style of teaching and learning allows adult learners to perform better in law school.
No. 3] 379Redefining Human Rights Lawyering
clinicians at times distinguished our enterprise from that of our poverty law and
community lawyering counterparts in a way that “excepted” us from exploring,
whether in the classroom or through project selection, our own replication of
privilege and hierarchy, or our own unexamined perpetuation of simplistic
imperialist narratives and victim essentialization. Those of us who teach in
human rights clinics therefore looked to others of us who teach in poverty law
and community lawyering clinics for rich lessons based on years of struggling to
incorporate the lessons of critical legal theory into our work. What we have
discovered through our conversations are a number of lessons learned, as well as
a number of shared challenges and new questions. Here we offer some of those
reflections, recognizing that this is the beginning of what we hope to be an
ongoing exploration and collaboration.
In particular, we highlight four areas in which our poverty law and community
lawyering clinical colleagues have stimulated our thinking about the application
of critical legal theory, both in our practice and in our pedagogy: (1) careful
selection of cases and projects that reflects a commitment to taking on riskier
endeavors that we situate in their social, political, and historical contexts; (2)
creating and adopting an ethical framework that is responsive to the challenges
we face in our work; (3) redefining community lawyering to include different
kinds of collaborative partnerships, from working with communities, to identify-
ing transnational dimensions to our work, to working with non-legal profession-
als; and (4) creating an ongoing self-awareness about power differentials and
how that informs our work with respect to race, class, culture, gender, ethnicity,
disability, sexual orientation, and sexual identity. Answers are not easy or
forthcoming in any of these areas, but engaging with the questions, and teaching
our students to identify and engage with these questions, is as critical, we believe,
as the answers themselves.
1. Carefully Selecting Cases/Projects and Situating Them Within a
Broader Context
Above, we discussed the collective failure of traditional human rights clinics to
find a place for teaching students about the socio-political and historical
determinants giving rise to the violations they endeavor to remedy. This dialogue
has clarified that poverty law clinics have similarly long struggled with teaching
students about the structural inequalities in which their individual clients are
positioned. So how then do we achieve this, and for what purpose? One strategy
by which to do this may be to choose projects, whether domestic or international,
that go beyond the readily apparent violations, beyond the moralistic, and which
provide opportunities to pressure hegemonic power and the consequences of the
ideology of neoliberalism. Of course, this should be done in consultation with
communities, identifying the issues that they, through their representatives, feel
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are most important to address. Also, in thinking about where our clinics are
situated, it may be strategic to consider selecting projects in which U.S.
misuse/abuse of power can be highlighted and exposed. We must then be
prepared to respond to the next question: for what purpose are we choosing cases
and projects that are richly layered in this way? Do we seek simply to teach about
the determinants of a case for its pedagogical value or its intellectual challenge,
or is there a tangible advocacy opportunity that may present itself? Even if
advocacy opportunities present themselves, are they consistent with the client’s
advocacy goals? If not, should we nevertheless seize these opportunities outside
the context of that particular client, and how? And can we always know in
advance which projects and cases will lend themselves to this sort of scrutiny?
a. Pedagogical Strategies:
“[T]he point is not just to explain the world but to change it”198
We suggest a rethinking of our pedagogical strategies to include the
political-economic and historical sources of human rights crises at the same time
we seek to remedy their consequences. By doing so, we contribute to the
reevaluation of the relationship between law and rights on the one hand, and
socio-economic structures on the other. Attention to the ideological logic of the
market provides students with the opportunity to examine the ways that the
excesses of capitalism contribute to “normalizing” human rights abuses. While
progress has been made in teaching cross-cultural competence, the development
of explicit conceptual frameworks for an understanding of the sources of harm
has lagged behind.199 It might be helpful also to include in our teaching the global
“emancipatory experiences” and successful movements to better appreciate the
promises of an alternative world.200
Attention should be given to perspectives that include issues of colonialism,
post-colonialism, global economics, and imperialism. Students should be encour-
aged to consider the ways in which U.S. interests preclude the development of a
consistent set of human rights norms. This may encourage students to deepen
their analysis and consider the ways in which economic globalization has
contributed to global human rights harms.
198. Robert W. Cox, The Point is Not Just to Explain The World but to Change It, in OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 86 (Christian Reus-Smit & Duncan Snidal eds., 2008).
199. Agarwal & Simonson, supra note 159, at 489 (noting that public interest legal organizations do
not necessarily have clear conceptions of social justice).
200. Santos, supra note 118 (identifying for example, Haitian independence in 1804, the Indigenous
movement—Quintin Lame in Colombia, the Sandinistas, the Cuban Revolution, Landless Movement in
Brazil, Zapatistas in Mexico).
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b. Developing the Capacity for “[R]iskier projects that are more aligned with
the transformative goals of empowerment, social justice”201
Vasuke Nesiah and Alan Keenan have persuasively argued that strategies
designed to ameliorate human rights abuses are not likely to be effective unless
they challenge hegemonic ideologies and dominant political structures.202 Such
strategies require the engagement of projects to confront the economic and political
factors that shape the violations and, at the same time, respond to the needs of victims.
Nitzah Berkovitch and Neve Gordon describe the limitations present in much
of human rights work:
While legal accomplishments can sometimes challenge social structures, they
are usually confined to mitigating the structure’s excesses (i.e., unintended
results that constitute violations). Consequently, they often also end up
strengthening the system itself, since by correcting some of the structure’s
‘dysfunction,’ direct litigation helps produce the belief that there is an impartial
system that adjudicates between parties and corrects wrongs. In this way it
helps silence structural criticism.203
Berkovitch’s and Gordon’s critique is at the core of critical legal theory. This
does not mean that legal strategies—as confined as they might be—ought to be
abandoned. However, without responding to the structural issues that may be
silenced, critical theory often fails to serve practice in any meaningful way. As
others who study human rights abuses have admonished, addressing violence
without recognizing it as “a broad condition in which endemic poverty, rapid
structural adjustment, and a lack of law enforcement are clustered risks
compounding rather than ameliorating it.”204
Client-specific cases and prototype human rights policy projects may present
constraints on our ability to address the structural realities that give rise to the
claims we undertake. Of course, these cases and projects are important, and we
will continue to undertake them despite limitations. The gains to be had, for
example, in representing individuals fleeing persecution or providing guidance
for responding to gender-based violence cannot be overstated. However, we
might consider projects that create spaces for both immediate response and
long-term transformative changes. Such projects would reflect the same tensions
contained within social justice movements outside of the realm of law. If we
represent individuals fleeing escalating drug-cartel violence in Mexico, or the
201. McKinley, supra note 97, at 101.
202. Vasuke Nesiah & Alan Keenan, Human Rights and Sacred Cows, Framing Violence, Disappear-
ing Struggles, in FROM THE MARGINS OF GLOBALIZATION, CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON HUMAN RIGHTS 261,
284 (Neve Gordon ed., 2004).
203. Nitza Berkovitch & Neve Gordon, The Political Economy of Transnational Regimes: The Case
of Human Rights, 52 INT’L. STUDIES. Q. 881, 894 (2008).
204. Benson et al., supra note 114.
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crisis of gender violence in Latin America, we might join forces with transna-
tional networks and local social movements, as discussed below, that are seeking
ways to oppose to current models of free trade.205 There are clearly many more
possibilities, and, in fact, some human rights practitioners have undertaken
projects that address sources of impunity and endeavor to affect fundamental
social change.
Human rights projects are difficult to identify in the abstract; they are often
dependent on extending our knowledge beyond that with which we are familiar
and they are most useful if they are determined and planned from the bottom up.
Boaventura de Sousa Santos cautions about the limitations of critical theory as it
is conceived in the global North and the practices it engenders. He states that “a
wide variety of new left practices occur in unfamiliar places carried out by
strange people; they also speak very strange non-colonial languages (aymara,
quechua, guarani, indi, urdi, isiZulu, kikongo or kiswahili) or less hegemonic
colonial languages such as Spanish and Portuguese and their cultural and
political references are non-Western.”206 He suggests that the work of human
rights advocates must include a process of developing a transnational socio-
political legal culture that identifies alternatives undertaken in solidarity with
resistance movements throughout the globe. Indeed, critical theory, together with
transformative practices, calls for nothing less than such initiatives.207
2. Adopting a Meaningful Ethical Framework
A lesson that resonates strongly from the Gulf Coast case study is the need for
rigorous accountability. Often, questions of our accountability emerge primarily
in discussions of the ethical parameters constraining our work. A challenge we
face, however, is that there is no professional code of conduct explicitly designed
for human rights practitioners, no commonly agreed-upon ethical rules. Many of
the professionals who work in the field of human rights may be governed by
ethical codes corresponding to their profession. But how far does this go towards
providing guidance or governance in employing the full range of human rights
advocacy tools?
Once we set afoot on this exploration, we discover that a series of ethical
questions emerge, questions with which our poverty law and community
lawyering colleagues have also struggled. It is important for us to dwell on the
lawyer-client relationship because it is at the heart of the common understanding
of the lawyer’s role and the basis for traditional ethical analysis. How do we
205. For a review of coalitions involved in such work, see ALLIANCE FOR RESPONSIBLE TRADE,
http://www.art-us.org/content/what-alliance-responsible-trade-art.
206. Bonaventura de Sousa Santos, The World Social Forum and the Global Left, 36 POL. & SOC. 247,
258 (2008).
207. Id. at 253 (arguing that the conception and the struggle for an alternative society has been the core
of critical theory).
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maintain a client-centered approach in our work and what does that entail,
whether it is about how we portray our clients publicly or about how we address
cross-cultural competencies? We also need to explore the more common
circumstances in human rights advocacy where the client is not technically an
individual. Then we must consider our relationship with our client vis-à-vis our
relationship with the larger human rights movement. If we do not have such a
relationship, how do we avoid becoming free agent activists beholden only to a
certain set of aspirational norms?208
In the Dominican Republic/Haiti case study, the Human Rights Clinic’s
experience with the advocacy itself became the basis of a pedagogical exercise in
exploring ethical dilemmas. As demonstrated from heated debates amongst
students that ensued in the classroom, “legal ethics,” as defined by the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct or any given state bar’s rules of ethics, was not
always a sufficient lens for examining various ethical dilemmas in human rights
practice. What value then is there in exploring the ethical codes of other
professions (medical, academic, journalism, humanitarian)?209 One proposal by a
student in the Columbia Law School Human Rights Clinic suggests adopting the
following eleven principles from various professions to guide the ethical
behavior of international human rights lawyers: exercise competence; undertake
effective communication; maintain independence; engage in zealous advocacy;
do no harm; protect life, health and dignity; assess risks/benefits to the
population; guarantee fully informed consent; ensure accuracy and objectivity;
practice cultural sensitivity; avoid conflicts of interest; and take steps to ensure
accountability.210
While we do not have space here to develop these principles in great depth, we
plan to do so in the future. For now, we think they serve as useful guideposts for a
consideration of the place of diverse ethics norms in our work.
3. Rethinking Community Lawyering: Local and Global
One transformative practice centers on the lawyer’s own focus and attention to
“collaborative lawyering.” As discussed in the domestic context, there is a strong
role for international/human rights lawyering that prioritizes a pedagogy based
on collaboration with impacted people otherwise known as “the clients.” This
model envisions a type of lawyering that cedes control and decision-making to
208. These were amongst the framing questions posed during the March 2008 Human Rights
Clinicians’ Meeting at Columbia Law School.
209. This analysis was developed through a series of classes taught at Columbia Law School and in
other institutions by Caroline Bettinger-Lopez and Peter Rosenblum, and a series of discussions between
several of us and our human rights clinical colleagues at, inter alia, the March 2008 Human Rights
Clinicians’ Meeting at Columbia Law School and the May 2010 AALS Clinicians’ Conference workshop
mentioned in the introduction to this Article.
210. See Rachel Barish, Professional Responsibility for International Human Rights Lawyers: A
Proposed Paradigm (2007) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors).
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non-attorney, local actors working for equitable, social change and recognizes the
systemic and structural inequalities. In this model, the lawyer must tailor his or
her own practices to cultivate meaningful and trusting relationships with the
client while remaining conscious of the process of collective mobilization and
cognizant of the broader social movement goals. In short, it is the essence of one
type of shared vision for justice that can have lasting and meaningful impact in
the kind of broad and deep system change that social movements are most
concerned about.211 How is this model achieved? We offer some tentative
suggestions for theory and approach.
a. Building Solidarity and Developing Broad Challenges to Injustice
Critical to this lawyering practice in both domestic and global settings is an
understanding that there is no single, monolithic “community” with which
lawyers interact. “Community” is often built by complex coalitions and alliances
that can include numerous actors and leaders, intentional partnerships, and
various relationships (or history of relationships) with government actors.
Lawyering based on respect for those within a community holds the people—
those people who are impacted the most by policies and decision-making—as
indispensable to and for a successful lawyering process. In this respect, the term
“collaborative lawyering” rather than “community lawyering” might better
describe the central values, relationship and alliance, between lawyer and client
in a participatory lawyering model aimed at tactical coordination, community
mobilization and large-scale transformation for justice.
Key approaches point lawyers toward realizing this model, which turns
traditional lawyering on its head. Rather than focusing on primarily individually-
centered goals, “collaborative lawyering” seeks to advance collective mobiliza-
tion and establish and build networks with participant control. To accomplish
this, lawyers should have a sophisticated understanding of the underpinnings of
critical legal theory: race, gender, and class oppression. In the international
human rights context, lawyers must also develop and monitor their own ideas,
discourse, and actions in light of social and cultural values; local economic and
political forces; needs of vulnerable populations involved (or not involved) in
decision-making; the community’s past experiences with collective action; and
the spectrum of movement priorities.
211. The limitations of traditional lawyering have been amply described in the literature. The civil
legal aid model has aimed to address the lack of lawyers and court access for poor people. In this way, the
model does not challenge the inherent systemic injustices. Working within the system,“[p]overty lawyers
have been described as oppressors, as domineering, as unreflective, as poor lawyers, or as unfeeling
bureaucrats.” Paul R. Tremblay, supra note 82, at 949 (1992) (focusing on the services poverty lawyers
provide and the structure of their relationships with clients, these types of critiques question the long-term
benefits of the traditional lawyering model whereby systemic oppression continues unchecked even as an
individual case might have a successful outcome).
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Lawyers should be adaptive to an often-chaotic social movement response that
is, by nature, fluid. Goals, strategies, and tactics vary and morph depending on
circumstances and grievances. In the international human rights context where a
“transnational lawyering” approach continues to grow, this premise is critical. As
donors invest heavily in reforming place-based politics, lawyers working for
large-scale law reform and those engaged in international advocacy that tests new
theories and claims in an increasingly-internationalizing context will confront
firsthand the legacies of opportunistic colonialism, globalization, and the impact
of neo-liberal economic and political forces. Lawyers should be ready to learn
and should expect to practice law with dramatically different boundaries. Specific
considerations emerge from the “collaborative lawyering” model as it is applied
in the international human rights context.
Importantly, lawyers must be cautious not to usurp or diminish community
power in any community process. “The risk that legal strategies will increase the
community’s ideological subjugation, rather than build its power, can only be
countered if the lawyer consciously identifies himself with ‘ground level
organization’ within the community . . . .”212 Even as the lawyer mindfully works
in an intentionally-collaborative process, the very fact that the lawyer is engaged
in lawyering within and on behalf of a vulnerable community itself presents
challenging questions about power and calls into question the limitations and
authenticity of the lawyer’s relationships with community members:
Lawyering relationships—like all relationships—cannot be purged of power or
the possibility of coercion and complicity with the group domination. The issue
of power pervades all aspects of the community lawyer’s job, from decisions
about whether to take on a case to the nature of the lawyer-client relationship to
tactical and strategic issues within a particular case.213
This tension around power calls into question inherent challenges with
lawyering and in particular, “collaborative lawyering” for justice. The lawyer
must confront not only power dynamics but also the legacy that “lawyers can be
and often are destructive of real justice.”214 Whether the “collaborative lawyer-
ing” model can be developed to its potential so that lawyers and the law are
actually used reliably as tools for social change by those who will benefit from
systemic social justice reforms is uncertain. The lawyer’s ability to actively
reflect on the dynamics of the profession in the world order and vis-à-vis social
justice goals must be part of a process that frees the lawyer from relationships
driven by power and privilege. This requires reflection on the profession as a
212. Lucie White, To Learn and Teach: Lessons from Driefontein on Lawyering and Power, 1988
WIS. L. REV. 699, 742 (1988).
213. Angela Harris et al., From “The Art of War” to “Being Peace”: Mindfulness and Community
Lawyering in a Neo-Liberal Age, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 2073 (2007).
214. William Quigley, Revolutionary Lawyering, 20 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 101 (2006).
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whole: “Current professional responsibility courses do not address justice or
fundamental inequality and the lawyer’s role in fashioning and maintaining that
inequality.”215
In the international human rights context, there are also serious risks of reprisal
and harm for lawyers in challenging the state’s authority or failures, but the
primary risks are borne by the people they serve who have no escape route from
the community in conflict. While the grave risks underscore the tremendous
transformative potential of involvement with global struggles, the dynamic of
risk creates natural tensions in the lawyer’s professional engagement in
international human rights issues and conflicts. As the scale of advocacy
increases, pressure in and on the local community also increasingly calls into
question whether the potential positive impacts of “collaborative lawyering” can
withstand and sustain. And for the participants—those with grievances about
systemic forces interfering with their own lives, they must also be able to endure
co-optation and conformation through an extremely pressurized process. As
Lucie White has noted, “social groups risk stunting their own aspiration.
Eventually they may find themselves pleading for permission to conform to the
status quo.”216 This caution resonated with those of us struggling with the denial
of life-sustaining health care in Miami, as we very much feared alienating the
providers on which our clients depended for survival with charges that they had
violated international human rights norms.
Finally, lawyers working in an international human rights context must
consider their own motivations and re-imagine what is possible. “[L]awyering
success is not measured by whether a case is won. It is rather measured by such
factors as whether the case widens the public imagination about right and wrong,
mobilizes political action behind new social arrangements, or pressures those in
power to make concessions.”217 This ideal is one that can carry lawyers forward
in strategic work for justice.
b. Creating Transnational Partnerships
Building on the importance of collaborative lawyering as a model for our
work, and reflecting on the importance of the partnership between human rights
lawyers and grassroots social movements, as underscored in the Gulf Coast case
study, we understand even more the critical importance of building transnational
alliances in our work, and where our work requires domestic, subnational
alliances. These transnational and subnational links allow us to remain grounded
in local realities, and constrain opportunities to subvert the agenda of those most
affected by replacing it with our own agendas as “outsiders,” or “foreigners.”
Moreover, these transnational links are imperative because of the possible
215. Id.
216. White, supra note 212, at 757.
217. Id.
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far-reaching impact of the work we do, and so to not consider these links is to act
irresponsibly in terms of anticipating all possible consequences and impacts of
our work. Thinking and acting transnationally thus is one antidote to a myopic
view of human rights.
To adequately respond to an increasingly interconnected, global world in
which the historical and structural determinants of human rights violations are
growing in complexity, human rights advocates, with human rights clinics at the
forefront, are well-positioned to strategically build transnational alliances.
Arguments that justice is fundamentally to be debated and delivered upon within
national borders have lost appeal as the social processes shaping peoples’ lives
routinely overflow territorial borders.218 The call to build transnational networks
extends beyond the development of universal norms to address shared human
rights concerns; it demands a vibrant and ongoing relationship between social
justice advocates as well as those most affected by human rights violations
themselves to engage each other in discussion of the challenges they face and
they opportunities for moving forward together. As Scott Cummings and Louise
Trubek note, transnationalism “acknowledge[s] the ultimate limits of state power
and assert[s] the need for globalized social justice strategies.”219
Transnationalism serves multiple purposes. First, it serves to strengthen and
render more effective the overall human rights project by amplifying within an
international context human rights concerns that may be seen as isolated
domestic or local concerns. Framing human rights violations as internationally-
occurring transgressions, for which all countries must be held accountable,
allows activists and advocates to mediate the tension between competing
conceptions of rights, often between national governments and locally-affected
persons and communities. This approach is particularly compelling in our
increasingly-globalized world, in which specific violations or transgressions are
so often not solely attributable (if they ever were) to one particular state actor, but
rather may be attributable to one or more state and non-state actors, including
international financial or political institutions.220
Second, the shared language of human rights allows advocates to converse
with each other and expand possibilities for their own advocacy. In certain
political contexts, such as the United States, in which global exceptionalism
continues to carry much currency within public discourse, advocates are able to
learn from their global counterparts as they build their campaigns even if they
218. Nancy Fraser, Reframing Justice in a Globalizing World, 36 NEW LEFT REV. 71 (Nov.-Dec. 2005).
219. Scott L. Cummings & Louise G. Trubek, Globalizing Public Interest Law, 13 UCLA J. INT’L L.
& FOREIGN AFF. 1 (2008).
220. See, e.g., NYU School of Law Center for Human Rights & Global Justice et al., Wòch nan Soley:
The Denial of the Right to Water in Haiti (2008), http://www.law.nyu.edu/ecm_dlv2/groups/public/
@nyu_law_website__alumni/documents/documents/ecm_pro_067267.pdf (examining accountability of
not only Haiti, but also the international community, including the Inter-American Development Bank
and the countries that guide it, for the lack of safe drinking water in Haiti).
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ultimately strategically eschew the language of human rights. For example, the
Women’s Institute for Leadership and Development (WILD) for Human Rights
used the Convention to End Discrimination Against Women to advocate for the
incorporation of a human rights framework at the local level in San Francisco,
although it used the language of “discrimination,” not “human rights,” to connect
with an audience that was unfamiliar with the terrain of international human
rights law.221
Additionally, transnational engagement allows movements struggling for
recognition within their own contexts another platform for such recognition,
through legitimizing their efforts abroad and then carrying that badge of
legitimacy home.222 Finally, advocates are increasingly realizing that without
transnational engagement, local or national claims for redistribution are inad-
equate and in fact, effective remedies extend beyond national economies and
institutions.223 Where decisions made in one territorial state have ripple effects
elsewhere, the call for concerted action is not just an ideal, it is imperative to
adequately address the violations. Transnationalism therefore becomes a means
by which to provide representation to the many who are denied the chance to
press their claims of misdistribution and misrecognition within borders outside of
their own, even though the forces that perpetrate injustice flow across borders.224
Advocates and students can learn from transnational alliances built amongst
people and communities affected by violations themselves. Many of these
transnational alliances have been built around regional free trade agreements,
workers’ rights, and corporate exploitation.225 At the grassroots level, local
groups sought out international allies to challenge government restructuring and
corporate projects stimulated by neoliberalism.226 One widely noted example
was the movement of people displaced by the World Bank-funded Narmada
River dams, in which mass resistance worked together with domestic litigation
and international advocacy before the World Bank and International Labor
Organization.227
221. Anu Menon, HUMAN RIGHTS IN ACTION: SAN FRANCISCO’S LOCAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
UNITED NATIONS’ WOMEN’S TREATY (CEDAW), S.F. DEP’T ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN, CITY AND CNTY. OF
S.F. (2010), http://www.sfgov3.org/Modules/ShowDocument.aspx?documentid!314.
222. Fraser, supra note 218, at 72. Nancy Fraser cites the example of feminists throughout the world
who are linking their struggles against local patriarchal practices to campaigns to reform international
law. Deborah Weissman describes such a network of feminists from Latin American and the Caribbean
who gather every few years for the Feminist Encuentros, in which thousands of feminist activists share
and design strategies to develop their political agenda on behalf of women’s rights. Deborah Weissman,
Gender and Human Rights: Between Morals and Politics, in GENDER EQUALITY 413-414 (McClain &
Grossman eds., 2009).
223. Fraser, supra note 218, at 72.
224. Id. at 78, 81.
225. Cummings & Trubek, supra note 219.
226. Id.
227. Smita Narula, The Story of Narmada Bachao Andolan: Human Rights in the Global Economy
and the Struggle Against the World Bank (N.Y. Univ. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Papers, Paper
No. 106, 2008), available at http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article!1106&context!nyu_plltwp.
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Another transnational development has emerged with the growth of Alien Tort
Claims Act litigation, in response to global outsourcing and resource extraction
by transnational corporations.228 Such litigation has afforded human rights
lawyers in the North the opportunity to work closely with survivors and NGOs in
the countries in which the violations occurred. For example, the Khulumani Alien
Tort Statute (ATS) litigation sought to hold liable dozens of foreign multinational
corporations and banks for their complicity in perpetrating the horrors of the
apartheid regime in South Africa.229 The plaintiff, a grassroots NGO entitled the
Khulumani Support Group, is comprised of members who are self-identified
“victims” and “survivors” of gross human rights violations under apartheid who
routinely engage in broad-based advocacy nationally and internationally.230
We clinicians must join this trend of transnationalism as we devise human
rights advocacy strategies. Moreover, we must encourage our students to engage
in the analysis of why transnational networks are important, how best to
operationalize them to achieve intended purposes, and to anticipate unintended
consequences.
Recently, U.S. clinics have started to build transnational networks with clinics
and human rights centers in the Global South. For example, the Global Alliance
for Justice Education was founded in the late 1990s to facilitate the network of
clinical and practice-oriented law school professors from around the world
interested in promoting social justice pedagogy. The Legal Resource Centre in
Ghana’s collaboration with U.S. law schools provides another interesting
example in that the partnership promotes alternative forms of public interest
practice geared toward reforming development.231 Another recent example is
found in the North-South Consortium between Diego Portales University School
of Law (Chile), University of the Andes School of Law (Colombia), University of
Miami School of Law, Columbia Law School, and Harvard Law School. In
February 2011, Diego Portales and Miami law schools hosted a convening,
Gender Justice in the Americas: A Transnational Dialogue on Sexuality,
Reproduction, Violence, and Human Rights, with the goal of promoting a
transnational exchange among advocates and scholars, including amongst law
school clinics, working on gender and sexuality issues from over twenty
countries throughout North, South, and Central America, and the Caribbean.232
Finally, we must identify possible opportunities to partner on cases with
transnational implications. Indeed, it is the rare human rights case or cause that
exists in a geographic vacuum. While a transnational perspective may not always
228. Cummings & Trubek, supra note 219. The ATCA provides federal court jurisdiction in the United
States for noncitizens bringing tort claims alleging a violation of international law. Id.
229. See KHULUMANI SUPPORT GROUP PAGE, http://www.khulumani.net/reparations/corporate/
222-lawsuit-overview.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2011).
230. Id.
231. Cummings & Trubek, supra note 219.
232. See www.law.miami.edu/genderjustice for additional information.
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be appropriate in a given case, it is a good idea for lawyers and clinicians to
always at least consider as much when pursuing a given case or legal strategy.
Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has in recent years cited to foreign law
in a number of its decisions, often accepting amicus briefs from foreign
individuals, NGOs, and entities that have an interest in the outcome of domestic
litigation in the United States.233 Embracing a transnational perspective does not
always come easy for U.S. lawyers, but it is important for advocates to
understand the implications of our country’s laws and policies abroad, and vice
versa – even if this information does not enter into a particular case or campaign.
Thus, for instance, in the case of Jessica Lenahan (Gonzales) v. United States
before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, involving the affirma-
tive obligations of the government to protect a domestic violence victim and her
children, an amicus brief submitted by twenty-nine amici from Latin America,
the Caribbean, and Canada underscored the potential normative impact of the
case at the regional level.234 In another example, students from the American
University Washington College of Law (WCL) worked together with students
from the Human Rights Centre at the University of Pretoria in South Africa to
make a joint submission and presentation to the African Commission on Human
and Peoples’ Rights advocating for the recognition of access to essential
medicines as part of the right to health.235 With the WCL students focused on
lessons from the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Human Rights System and
the Pretoria students focused on the African Human Rights System and domestic
jurisprudence throughout Africa, this project signaled the potential of opening up
further conversations between regional human rights systems.
c. Developing a Framework for Lawyering that May Have Applicability Across
Different Disciplines/Realms
Truly embracing a collaborative lawyering model also allows us lawyers to
work alongside other professionals. The identification of the structural determi-
nants of human rights violations may enable an examination of the sources of
other social problems that may not generally be regarded as human rights
concerns. For example, one might move from the individual and idiosyncratic
explanations for deviant behavior to the structural/socio-economic promises to
233. See, e.g., Brief for Christopher Simmons, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Roper
v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633), available at http://www.njdc.info/pdf/death_penalty/
48%20nations.pdf.
234. See Brief for the Ctr. of Justice and Int’l Law et. al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, ¶ 1,
Jessica Gonzales v. United States, (No. 1490-05); Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 52/07, OEA/Ser.L./V/
II.128, doc. 19 (2007), http://www.law.columbia.edu/center_program/human_rights/InterAmer/
GonzalesvUS; see also Bettinger-Lopez, supra note 25.
235. ACHPR, Resolution on Access to Health and needed Medicines in Africa, Res.141 (XXXXIIII)08
(Nov. 24, 2008), available at http://www.achpr.org/english/resolutions/resolution141_en.htm (last vis-
ited Apr. 9, 2011).
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enhance critical criminal law, domestic violence law, and provide for broader
solutions. Victim and violator alike are formed by social arrangements that are
historically contingent and subject to variable factors. In the realm of socio-
economic rights, the work of human rights lawyers would be amplified by
working with economists and political scientists in examining development-
based approaches in tandem with right-based approaches to issues.236 By
enriching our pedagogical, theoretical, and practical approach to challenge the
systems that produce anti-social norms, we may contribute to a better understand-
ing of the relationship between institutional and individual behaviors and thus
assume “a more complex recognition of shared responsibility” for the production
of rights violations.237
4. Create an Ongoing Self-Awareness Amongst Our Students
Much ink has been spilled in creating a rich corpus of scholarship about how to
create a pedagogy that explores power differentials between students, clients,
communities, institutions, supervisors, and the academy. As we dialogue with our
colleagues, however, we are reminded that these teachings have not become
entrenched in the pedagogy of human rights clinics. This is true despite the fact
that often these differences are striking and likely inform the lawyering in either
beneficial or adverse ways. We think it critical to engage in this reflective practice
of building cross-cultural competencies because it encourages students to create a
practice of self-awareness and self-improvement, day-to-day, in cross-cultural
lawyering238 interactions and it also creates a common vocabulary for a shared
discussion of these practices in individual, group and classroom settings.239 It is
all the more important for human rights students to squarely locate themselves in
the lawyering process, as the international human rights movement traditionally
allowed lawyers to disassociate themselves from their clients and causes, either
because of the distance involved, cultural barriers, or the implicit moral
236. See, e.g., Vivek Maru, Allies Unknown: Social Accountability and Legal Empowerment, 12
HEALTH & HUM. RTS. J. 83 (2010), available at http://www.hhrjournal.org/index.php/hhr/article/view/205/
300.
237. Alan Rosenthal & Elaine Wolf, Unlocking the Potential of Reentry and Reintegration 6 (Ctr. for
Cmty. Alt., Just. Strategies Working Paper, 2004), available at http://www.communityalternatives.org/pdf/
unlocking_potential.pdf.
238. Cross-cultural lawyering occurs when lawyers and clients have different ethnic or cultural
heritages and when they are socialized by different subsets within ethnic groups. Thus, everyone is
multi-cultural to some degree. Cultural groups and cultural norms can be based on ethnicity, race, gender,
nationality, age, economic status, social status, language, sexual orientation, physical characteristics,
marital status, role in family, birth order, immigration status, religion, accent, skin color, or a variety of
other characteristics.
239. Susan Bryant & Jean Koh Peters, Five Habits for Cross-Cultural Lawyering, in RACE, CULTURE,
PSYCHOLOGY & LAW (Kimberly Barrett & William George eds., 2005); Susan Bryant, The Five Habits:
Building Cross-Cultural Competence in Lawyers, 8 CLIN. L. R. 33 (2001); Susan Bryant & Jean Koh
Peters, Reflecting on the Habits after Ten Years: Teaching About Race, Identity, Culture, Language and
Difference (forthcoming chapter in an anthology on clinical pedagogy).
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justification of their role as identified with the “universally accepted” agenda of
the human rights framework.
Ten years ago, Sue Bryant and Jean Koh Peters developed the Five Habits of
Cross-Cultural Lawyering that offer a workable pedagogy for teaching and
reflecting on cross-cultural lawyering. These Habits240 (Habit One: Degrees of
Separation and Connection, Habit Two: The Three Rings, Habit Three: Parallel
Universes, Habit Four: Red Flags and Correctives, and Habit Five: The Camel’s
Back) are based on three principles: “1) [T]hat all lawyering is cross-cultural, 2)
that the competent cross-cultural lawyer remains present with this client, ever
respecting her dignity, voice and story, and 3) that the cross-cultural lawyer must
know oneself as a cultural being to understand his or her biases and ethnocentric
world views.”241
Acknowledging these principles are important to avoiding diving into the
“Savage-Victim-Savior” metaphor described by Matua.242 Through these prac-
tices, students explore and address not only the power differentials that inform
their lawyering, but also confront the fact that culture is everywhere; indeed, the
law itself is a culture which cannot be taken for granted, especially transnation-
ally or amongst communities who have been shaped by differing values and
behavior. These practices allow students to understand concepts like implicit bias
and ethnocentric thinking, which, in turn, allow them to comprehend the ways
that all people misjudge, mishear and use their power inappropriately. Impor-
tantly, students are shaken out of rigid ways of thinking, for even as we teach
them about cultural theory, we reinforce the notion that culture should not be
thought of as determinative, as a perfect predictor of individual or community
behavior. Indeed, when students early on understand to look for the cultural
complexities and nuances within each person as an individual, we, as a human
rights movement, can effectively answer the critiques levied against us in terms
of essentializing victims and perpetuating imperialist narratives.
In this practice, it is critical not to depoliticize the role that race and culture
play in perpetuating systemic injustice and creating the material inequalities that
our clients and partners confront. Teaching about race, ethnicity, and culture also
improves our students’ ability to understand how other vectors of oppression
operate in the legal system, and to learn how to use this understanding to achieve
justice and find legal solutions for individuals and communities. It also enables
240. In brief, Habit One encourages students to consciously identify similarities and differences
between clients and themselves, and assess both the impact and significance of these on the
attorney/client relationship. Habit Two asks students to go further and assess how these similarities and
differences influence interactions between clients, legal decision-makers, opponents, and the lawyers.
Habit Three invites students to identify multiple alternate explanations for clients’ behavior. Habit Four
encourages cross-cultural communications. Habit Five prompts students to recognize other factors that
impact on attorney/client interactions, and if necessary, to take corrective actions to remedy a derailed
relationship. Reflecting on the Habits After Ten Years, supra, note 239, at 51-59.
241. Id. at 3.
242. See Matua, supra note 4.
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them to become leaders on these issues in the procession and broader society, as
well as provides them a safe space where they can explore their own racial
identity and how it shapes their lawyering process. Our reticence to make these
lessons an explicit part of our pedagogy will signal to our students that these
issues are not important or should not be discussed within the context of their
work. We will have failed to prepare them to be the kind of self-reflective
professionals necessary to transform the human rights field.
5. Lessons Learned and Offered
a. What Human Rights Clinicians Have Learned
Perhaps most importantly, what we as human rights clinicians have learned
from our colleagues practicing in the area of poverty law and community
lawyering is that the justification for an “exceptionalism” for human rights within
the clinical field—that human rights clinics are different and therefore require a
different pedagogy and set of lawyering tools—is overinflated. We fully
recognize that as a newer clinical discipline, human rights clinics have yet to
incorporate many of the traditional critical legal theory principles in scholarship
and in practice, but we find the theoretical underpinnings of critical legal theory
allow the principles to be extended and applied to the work we do.
b. What Poverty Law and Community Lawyering Clinicians Have Learned
Based on our conversations with our human rights clinical colleagues, we as
poverty law and community lawyering clinicians are energized by the expansive-
ness and creativity that routinely informs human rights lawyering. One of the
outgrowths of not having as many strict legal constraints on the work, in terms of
available claims or possible fora, appears to have been to encourage human rights
practitioners to think outside the box, to view the law ultimately as a construct,
and to push for interpretations and outcomes that are more consistent with our
clients’ objectives and the objectives of grassroots social movements. It is
important to be strategic about when to use human rights, though, and when it is
used, of how to talk about it with clients, the public, and decision-makers. Social
movements have responded well to embracing the language of human rights, as
the manner in which human rights principles are articulated more effectively
speak to client and constituent interests and how they define the injustices they
face.243
243. The Border Network of Human Rights and the Coalition of Immokalee Workers, amongst other
movements, have readily utilized the human rights discourse as an effective organizing principle. Indeed,
the Coalition of Immokalee Workers has for years waged powerful Fair Food and Anti-Slavery
Campaigns, which have resulted in some notable successes, including most recently a signed agreement
with the Florida Tomato Growers Exchange to extend the Fair Food principles, including a strict code of
conduct. Although in many respects, the worker-members in CIW fall outside traditional federal and state
labor protections, they have strategically used human rights principles, treaties and instruments to include
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While the lessons many poverty lawyers have internalized about ethical
questions such as who is the client and to whom or what value system does the
lawyer owe allegiance continue to reverberate, they take on more urgency and
new meaning as we struggle to digest the possibilities of incorporating human
rights strategies into our work. We look to the ethical questions raised by our
human rights colleagues with great interest as they navigate new but seemingly-
familiar territory. Similarly, the admonition of John Calmore that poverty law “is
not a tourist adventure” and that “we must eschew the routine of the autonomous,
interloping advocate” strikes us as particularly important to bear in mind as we
embark on new strategies.244 We are challenged by our human rights colleagues
to employ and to consider the lessons of “ambivalent advocacy” that may be
called for in teaching our students about employing human rights strategies as
well as more traditional advocacy strategies, in domestic social justice clinics.
c. The Universal Periodic Review Process: Promises, Limitations
and Challenges
In 2010, human rights advocates, poverty lawyers, grassroots advocates and
members of communities confronted by the United States’ failure to achieve the
fulfillment of human rights for all, participated in various capacities as the United
States underwent its first ever Universal Periodic Review (UPR), a process that
provides a unique opportunity for applying the critiques put forth in this
Article.245 Their experiences demonstrate both the promises and limitations of
collaborative lawyering aimed at bringing human rights home, and the challenges
associated with concretizing critical theory in the development and implementa-
tion of advocacy strategies.
In creating the UPR, a process through which all United Nations member
countries submit themselves to a review of their human rights record and receive
a series of recommendations upon which they will be assessed again on a
four-year cycle, the UN Human Rights Council (HRC) explicitly set forth the
following objectives: “fulfillment of a State’s human rights obligations and
commitments and an assessment of positive developments and challenges faced
by the State;”246 and, ultimately, “the improvement of the human rights situation
on the ground.”247 The HRC also explicitly resolved that a core principle of the
provisions regarding rights and protections in a Code of Conduct that exceed those found in U.S. law.
Greg Asbed, Coalition of Immokalee Workers: “Golpear a Uno es Golpear a Todos!” To Beat One of Us
is to Beat Us All!, in 3 BRINGING HUMAN RIGHTS HOME 1-24 (Cynthia Soohoo, Catherine Albisa, Martha
F. Davis, eds., 2008); Kristofer Rios, After Long Fight, Farmworkers in Florida Win an Increase in Pay,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2011, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/19/us/19farm.html?_r!1&scp!
1&sq!coalition%20immokalee%20workers&st!cse.
244. Calmore, supra note 73, at 1956.
245. See supra note 27 for more information on the UPR.
246. Human Rights Council Res. 5/1, Annex B.2.4(b) (June 18, 2007).
247. Id. at Annex B.2.4(a).
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UPR be the recognition of “the universality, interdependence, indivisibility and
interrelatedness of all human rights.”248 And, critically, the HRC articulated that
“participation of all relevant stakeholders” must serve as a central component of
the process.249
The U.S. Human Rights Network (USHRN), under the guidance of the UPR
Planning Committee, pursued a collective advocacy approach wherein advocates
would coordinate with others across their respective advocacy silos to build a
more inclusive human rights movement that accounted for the interdependence
and intersectionality of rights, and made room for voices of communities across
the United States not often heard in Washington, D.C., much less across the
Atlantic Ocean in Geneva. The ultimate goal in seeking to support and strengthen
a broad-based human rights movement was to ensure a movement that would
transcend the episodic advocacy around the Geneva-based UPR, and would reach
back to the communities engaged in the struggle to achieve the promise of human
rights in a meaningful and concrete way.250 In this consciously collaborative
approach, a broad cross-section of the advocacy community came together in
pursuit of a range of human rights issues from housing rights, criminal justice,
environmental justice, health care, immigration, to national security and human
rights, among others.
While the UPR is unique among the human rights advocacy mechanisms in
that it allows advocates to address all of the rights contained in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, including economic, social, and cultural rights, in
addition to the traditional civil and political rights enshrined in the U.S.
Constitution and Bill of Rights, it is not the panacea for all human rights ills
communities across the United States confront. Instead, advocates embraced it as
one additional mechanism for engaging in an interdisciplinary discourse on
human rights.
But challenges persist in realizing the promise of a truly collaborative,
community-based advocacy movement. Disparities in resources, experience, and
access between the professional advocates and the communities on whose behalf
they purport to advocate are real. The ability to take the time away from local
struggles against eviction, denial of health care, lack of access to a quality
education, or discrimination—often under the threat of retaliation—is, in many
ways, representative of a privilege not equally shared. As professional advocates,
we must then spend more time reaching out to community representatives,
listening to their concerns and priorities, and in every way, work to ensure
meaningful, rather than token, participation. The participation of community
248. Id. at Annex B.1.3(a).
249. Id. at Annex B.1.3(m).
250. See UPR Goals Document, USHRN (Feb. 9, 2011), available at http://www.ushrnetwork.org/
content/articles/ushrn-upr-goals.
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lawyers has helped to bridge the divide between the national and international
non-governmental organizations and the communities across the United States,
but that bridge is only as strong as the underlying supports that allow for full
inclusion of affected community members themselves.
The on-site consultations conducted by the United States Government in
preparation of their UPR Report to the UN Human Rights Council brought into
focus the challenges in bridging the advocacy divide and the need for ongoing
critical reflection and challenges to the existing power structures. While the UPR
process calls upon governments to consult with civil society, to engage the
relevant stakeholders, nowhere is it defined who are the “relevant stakeholders,”
and who is “civil society.” Are these categories comprised of national and
international human rights NGOs, or does it also include members of communi-
ties excluded from existing legal and power structures in the United States, such
as prisoners, undocumented migrants, indigenous peoples, sex workers, domestic
workers, and agricultural workers? And what constitutes “participation” in the
process? Is it enough for representatives of marginalized communities or
“experts” in the field to speak on their behalf? Is it enough to have one meeting
with the government at which individuals are given five minutes to present their
concerns? Is it enough for people to be given the opportunity to submit written
interventions or to participate in a teleconference, rather than engage in a
meaningful dialogue during which all participants are given an opportunity to be
heard, and where answers and action can be expected? The answer to all of these
questions from the communities in which the consultations occurred—and more
importantly, in the communities left out of consultations—was a resounding
“no.”
Perhaps even more confounding than the questions above, are questions
related to the crafting of advocacy strategy and messaging, both within the
advocacy movement and in engaging the external world. In conducting human
rights trainings related to the UPR, the goals were to encourage broader
participation and engage more advocates in the process, while at the same time
managing expectations for a process that requires long-term engagement and
rarely will result in immediate, concrete changes to the human rights situation on
the ground. In the advocacy strategies and external messaging, questions persist
as to how much should we allow ourselves to be confined to what we deem to be
politically viable asks, framed in existing legal structures, rather than attempt to
upend those structures, and challenge the premises underlying perceptions of
viability, and at what risk to our credibility and our seat at the table? The study of
critical theory leaves us to struggle with these questions as we seek to bring
outsider voices in. But as advocates and clinicians, we must constantly question
our assumptions and our roles, and always work to ensure we use our privilege to
create room and access for those voices that are so often excluded, rather than to
fill the space ourselves. And we must simultaneously ensure that we are teaching
the why and how of these lessons to our students.
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V. LOOKING AHEAD TOWARDS A NEW CRITICAL APPROACH TO HUMAN RIGHTS
ADVOCACY: BUILDING A DISCOURSE OF HOPE
By way of conclusion, we distill the pedagogical lessons we have collectively
learned from our discussions and reflections, and offer them as teaching guides
for human rights practice. Although these concerns are certainly incomplete, and
are meant to encourage further questions and debate, they reflect the lessons we
feel have been most critical to us at this stage of our exploration. We have learned
it is important in doing this work to: critically examine the utility of a human
rights approach on a case-by-case basis; carefully select cases and projects
considering the unique positioning of the clinic; situate human rights work within
a broader grassroots social movement; identify the distinct roles of different
players in a human rights advocacy strategy; broaden a litigation strategy with
non-litigation endeavors; include a focus on economic, social and cultural rights;
adopt a client-centered approach that uncovers and embraces authentic client
narrative; develop a framework for ethics in human rights practice; build
transnational alliances and consider transnational dimensions of work; teach
socio-historic determinants to highlight advocacy opportunities; engage students
in routine practice of self-reflective lawyering, particularly encouraging explora-
tions of power differentials, strategically attempt to map the goals and bench-
marks of a human rights campaign; and, anticipate any unintended consequences
of human rights work.
Critical theory has provided guidance in teaching and advocacy in the field of
human rights both in the international/transnational realm and social justice
lawyering in the United States. The concerns raised in this Article suggest,
however, that the potential of critical theory has not been fully realized.
Undoubtedly, the very nature of critical theory cautions against a totalizing
theoretical frame or the usefulness of a template praxis. The effort to improve our
approach to human rights is not a call to develop a monolithic response nor does
it suggest that improvement comes easily. Rather, it acknowledges that a critical
approach to general legal principles embedded in human rights law provides an
opportunity for “a shared vision of justice [which] can be forged through
dialogue; in which questions of value can be posed, the exercise of power
challenged and the cold logic of the market subordinated to broader human
needs.”251
Engaging in human rights work signifies a commitment to international solidarity.
One educator has described the benefits of teaching critical theory, noting the
dependency of such pedagogy on engagement with the social world and states:
Thus it comes with a certain discourse of hope . . . . [C]ritical social theorists
are also accustomed to optimistic phrases, such as “pedagogy of hope” (Freire,
251. Tor Krever, Calling Power to Reason, 65 NEW LEFT REV. 141, 143 (2010).
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1994), “pedagogy of love” (Darder, 2002), “curriculum for utopia” (Stanley,
1992), “care of the self” (Foucault, 1986), “democracy and education” (Dewey,
1916), “school reform as if democracy matters” (Fraser, 1997), and “women
teaching for change” (Weiler, 1994b).252
In reflecting on the aftermath of the 2005 Gulf Coast disasters, Bill Quigley
underscored the importance of hope in the life of social justice advocates:
Hope is also crucial to this work. Those who want to continue the unjust status
quo spend lots of time trying to convince the rest of us that change is
impossible. Challenging injustice is impossible they say. Because the mer-
chants of the status quo are constantly selling us hopelessness and diversions,
we must actively seek out hope. When we find hope, we must drink deeply of
its energy and stay connected to that source. When hope is alive, change is
possible.253
Critical theory that encompasses the complex historical determinants of rights
violations creates the potential for the efficacy of new modes of practice.
Moreover, it opens the field further to new interpretations and new solidarities.
252. Leonardo, supra note 193.
253. William Quigley, Letter to a Law Student Interested in Social Justice, 1 DEPAUL J. FOR SOC. JUST.
7, 27 (2007).
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